Animal Welfare Bill - Standing Committee A

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Animal Welfare Bill

Roger Gale: Before we proceed, I should say that I have been well briefed on what happened this morning. There have been debates on a copious number of amendments, and clause 7 is very short, so I do not expect a lengthy or repetitive stand part debate.

Clause 7 - Fighting etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Bill Wiggin: Thank you, Mr. Gale, and welcome back to the Chair. We had an interesting and important debate, as you say, and I shall keep my comments short. We need to decide carefully whether the clause stands part of the Bill not because of what is in it, but because of what is not. I hope that during the break the Minister had a chance to think carefully about the feelings in the Committee on what recorded information is legitimate.
We understand the difficulties of drafting such a clause, and we know that the Government already propose to introduce controls on certain types of obscene materials in other legislation. I hope that the Committee has been something of a pathfinder in identifying what is obscene to us in animal welfare terms rather than in a pornographic or sexual manner. We face that problem specifically with dog fighting. I hope that the Minister will tell us that he has reconsidered his position and has positive comments to make. He controls all the tools necessary to draft something that would go some way towards alleviating the Committee’s fears.

Ben Bradshaw: I do not intend to dwell on the less contentious aspects of the clause, but I shall say a few words about the part that was the subject of most of the debate this morning: the recording of fighting. I listened carefully to what was said in the Committee, and I hope that Members accept that the making of a recording is covered by the provisions on participation in, or presence at, a fight. However, I will reflect, in discussion with others, on whether it would be possible to make changes that would reassure hon. Members that even the private distribution of recordings was covered, bearing in mind the difficulty of proving whether the activity recorded took place in this country.
On the possession of a recording, I outlined to the Committee some of the difficulties of criminalising the mere possession of an image, given that the possession of far more serious images is currently not criminalised. I will reconsider whether it would be possible to tie that possession to an event that had taken place in this country. The difficulty of proving that was why this provision was dropped from the draft Bill.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said. He has gone a long way towards alleviating our fears. He is becoming a bit of a master at changing direction in the Committee, which we welcome. I said on Second Reading that I hoped he would not become entrenched. He has not, and we are grateful for the progress that he has made.

Norman Baker: I want to re-emphasise that point. I am pleased that the Minister has reflected over lunch—or been beaten up by his colleagues, I am not quite sure which. Either way, I am pleased that he has decided to reflect on the issue. There was, and is, genuine concern among all three parties and all members of the Committee about the potential loophole, which we want to see closed. We are happy for the Minister to reflect on that point and come back with something in his own time. If the Bill proceeds without some measure to prevent the recording of dog fights for distribution or private consumption, we will not be happy. It is therefore important that the loophole be closed.

Greg Mulholland: I intervene to echo the comments about the Minister being prepared to reconsider the issue. We need to ensure that the clause relates not only to animal fighting but to any act of cruelty. I am keen to see whether that will be taken forward as part of the debate.

Norman Baker: I understand that point, and doubtless the Minister will reflect on it, too. I welcome his statement; it would be churlish to do otherwise, because we want to see movement from him. How long does he think he will need to reflect on the matter? Will he have reflected sufficiently by Report, or will he still be reflecting during the Committee stage in the House of Lords?

Ben Bradshaw: We shall endeavour to reflect by Report. One point I made during my remarks this morning is that sometimes the reason the Government cannot formulate a particular provision is the difficulty or impossibility of formulating it in an enforceable and practical way. I did not hear any practical suggestions this morning, and that is why we need to undertake discussions with some organisations that might have an idea of what is practical and enforceable. If we can do that, we intend to do so before Report.

Shona McIsaac: I welcome you, Mr. Gale, to the Committee’s afternoon sitting.
I deprecate all forms of cruelty, including any cruelty to my hon. Friend the Minister. I should like to reassure him of that. His statement reassures us that he  takes seriously what we say, and I welcome his assurance in this stand part debate that he will consider what can be done. The Committee is particularly concerned about dog fighting, and if he can liaise with his Home Office colleagues about what are known as squish videos, that may be useful, too.

Roger Gale: Before we proceed, may I make a request to all hon. Members? If they wish to speak, will they please make every effort to stand? This room is particularly difficult to chair, because the sight lines from the Chair are appalling. One Front-Bench spokesman on his or her feet can effectively obliterate the entire Committee. It also helps the Chair if you indicate in advance that you want to speak. As a matter of interest, if you can catch my eye, or that of Mrs. Humble, while somebody else is speaking, it gives us a clue. We are blessed with many talents, but second sight is not one of them.

Clause 8 - Duty of person responsible for animal to ensure welfare

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 88, in clause 8, page 4, line 17, leave out ‘in all the circumstances’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 128, in clause 8, page 4, line 19, leave out
‘the extent required by good practice’
and insert ‘an appropriate extent’.

Bill Wiggin: The thought of obliterating the Committee is far from attractive.
Amendment No. 88 is a probing amendment that seeks to clarify what might be considered an unnecessary phrase in legislation. “In all the circumstances” is not necessary, because it is already covered by the previous phrase about reasonable steps. Moreover, the term might provide a suspected offender with a legal loophole that could be exploited in court, and we should not want that to happen.
For instance, if a person purchases an animal such as a baby boa constrictor, they will need to provide it with a suitable environment, as detailed in subsection (2). When they purchase the boa constrictor, it may be quite small, and its welfare needs easy to provide for. However, when the snake grows bigger, the owners may not be able to provide fully for the snake’s welfare needs. If those circumstances were considered in a court of law, someone who had possibly committed a welfare offence might be found not guilty on that basis. Ignorance is not a suitable defence, and I hope that the Minister will clarify the matter.
I have been advised on amendment No. 128 by the RSPCA, and on this occasion I share its concerns that the term “good practice” would be ineffective until defined in future secondary legislation. The Bill makes no reference to what constitutes good practice, and that might pose a problem in a court of law. To interpret laws, courts must have clear directions, and while we wait for good practice codes and regulations  to be enacted, there might be inconsistencies in interpreting the law. What constitutes good practice could be interpreted differently by different courts. The amendment would give the courts discretion to examine the circumstances of each case, rather than feeling bound by the undefined term “good practice”.

Angela Smith: I fail to understand why “an appropriate extent” is any less subjective than “good practice”. Once good practice is determined, it offers an objective measure for the courts to use. Surely, “an appropriate extent” offers too many get-out clauses in the courts.

Bill Wiggin: Although the hon. Lady is always welcome to intervene, had she paused for a moment I would have finished my closing comments as follows: the expression “an appropriate extent” would transcend any future code that might seek to define “good practice” because it is more flexible and adaptable to different circumstances. I hope that that answers the hon. Lady’s question and that the Committee will accept the amendment.

Shona McIsaac: Although the hon. Gentleman said that these are probing amendments, they have merit.
Amendment No. 88 would delete “in all the circumstances” which would make it easier to apply the provision in the courts. It is as simple as that and the amendment certainly has merit.
Amendment No. 128 is also important because the term “good practice” is essentially subjective and its inclusion could cause evidential debate about the meaning and could lengthen unnecessarily any court case. A better term to use might be “an appropriate manner”. Will the Minister reflect on that and discuss with his officials whether the wording could be improved so that it is easier for the courts to show that a welfare offence has taken place?

Philip Hollobone: I agree that the words “good practice” at the end of subsection (1) are subjective. The term may be clear and of use to people in certain industries—for example, farmers, pet shop owners and so on—but its meaning will not necessarily be apparent and consistent to the average person on the street. The combination of “lawful purpose” and “lawful activity” in subsection (3) implies that an industry that uses animals sets the standard and could argue that as their activities are lawful and not illegal a lower standard of welfare is acceptable for the animals kept for that purpose. That would negate DEFRA’s previous statements that the introduction of the welfare offence will successfully deal with those animals whose welfare needs are unlikely to be met when they are used commercially.

Ben Bradshaw: With reference to the hon. Gentleman’s comments, these concerns about circumstances were also raised yesterday on another clause and I assured the Committee that they were not a get-out clause. The point in this clause is that the Government believe that it would be unreasonable and disproportionate to have an absolute welfare standard that does not take account of the circumstances in  which an animal is kept. The Bill is based on the central premise that it is appropriate for people to keep animals for a variety of purposes, but that minimum standards should be set for the behaviour of people towards those animals. There is a balance to be struck between the interests of animals and humans, and different circumstances will apply in different situations. In clause 8, the word “circumstances” is important to that approach; I shall give an example.
A pet hamster in a cage may not have the same opportunities to express its normal behaviour as one that is running around in the desert, its natural habitat. If the welfare offence were applied as an absolute test without regard to the animal’s circumstances, there would be a risk that just keeping a hamster in a cage would breach the welfare offence. We believe that it is right that the Bill allows for welfare to be assessed in the context of the purpose for which the animal is kept and the activity undertaken in relation to it, but not as a get-out clause.

Shona McIsaac: I thank my hon. Friend for his example relating to hamsters. The first line of clause 8 states:
“A person commits an offence if he does not take such steps as are reasonable”.
Nobody would suggest that it was reasonable to recreate a desert environment in a child’s bedroom, for example, to offer a hamster its natural habitat, so surely the issue is covered in the clause.

Ben Bradshaw: I still think it important to add to “reasonable” the fact that there may be different circumstances. I do not believe that the qualification will lead to some animals being kept in unacceptable conditions. To refer to the example cited by the hon. Member for Leominster (Bill Wiggin), if a boa constrictor outgrew its environment, it is likely that a court would consider that the fact that it had once been small was not a defence. Subsection (2) makes it clear that
“its need for a suitable environment”
should be taken into consideration by the court. I am about to come to good practice, and good practice for a snake would include reasonable space.
Amendment No. 128 deals with good practice. It may help hon. Members if I explain why we changed—

Justine Greening: Will the Minister give way?

Ben Bradshaw: Is the hon. Lady’s intervention on this point?

Justine Greening: It is on good practice.

Ben Bradshaw: Very well.

Justine Greening: There is a difference between good practice and appropriateness. One implies a potentially separate body establishing what good practice is; the other implies some responsibility on the part of the individual to assess for themselves what is  appropriate. That is one of my concerns about the use of the term “good practice”. It should be partly down to the individual to assess appropriateness, because only they can really judge the circumstances in which they are taking care of an animal’s welfare.

Ben Bradshaw: The hon. Lady makes my point for me by acknowledging that the term “appropriate” is far more subjective. I do not want the Bill to allow individuals to make judgments for themselves about the appropriate way of looking after an animal. That is exactly why we changed the wording. The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, during its pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, agreed that, as “welfare” is a neutral term, the Bill should clarify that it is necessary to ensure good welfare. We accepted that recommendation and the Bill was redrafted; otherwise there could have been uncertainty as to the intention. That is why we included the provision about doing all that is reasonable to meet the needs of an animal and meeting its needs to the extent required by good practice.
I agree with the hon. Lady—this is where I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Shona McIsaac)—that the term “appropriate” is far more vague, subjective and ill defined than “good practice”. I hope that, by providing the example of the cat code, I have given members of the Committee some idea of how the codes of good practice will help to inform the decisions of the courts and help with recognition of what is good practice. That is preferable to the term “an appropriate extent”, which is highly subjective, as the hon. Member for Putney (Justine Greening) acknowledged.

Shona McIsaac: My hon. Friend kindly provided the draft cat code, which I have read and which includes information on not creating a fat cat by feeding it too much. My concern relates to the timing. If the codes of practice are not available when the Bill is enacted, case law may define good practice, and the codes may say something else. I hope that the Minister takes that point.

Ben Bradshaw: I hope that the Bill passes swiftly through the House and on to the statute book, but I acknowledge that, unfortunately, it will not be possible to draw up by then a code of practice for every species of animal that might be kept by human beings. That does not detract from my point. Even in the absence of a completed code of practice, it would be easier for courts, welfare experts or scientists to argue what is “good practice” than what is “appropriate”, which is a far vaguer and—as the hon. Member for Putney acknowledged—more subjective term.
Amendment No. 128 would go against the recommendation of the EFRA Committee to refine the use of the neutral term “welfare”. It would leave the courts and individuals with less clear guidance as to what good welfare would be in each particular case. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I want to press the Minister slightly before I make a decision on the amendment. I tried my best to follow closely what he said, and in the case of my snake, unless the Minister actually states the length of snake per length of tank in the code of practice, it will be difficult to make the code absolute and proper. We therefore want the term “appropriate extent” rather than the more general terms in the Bill. I understand where the Minister is coming from, and we want to avoid being totally prescriptive, but this part of the Bill allows the Government to be even more prescriptive, and I have some concerns about it. However, I recognise that he will do his best with the codes.
I believe that the relevant code states that a cat should be neither too fat nor too thin. That worries me slightly because that is what I would like to be, although whether I am depends on whom I invite to give their opinion—my wife is rather critical. We need the Minister to assure us that we are going to provide for the best possible standards. If he just nods, I will be happy.
Mr. Bradshawindicated assent.

Bill Wiggin: I thank the Minister and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Shona McIsaac: I beg to move amendment No. 204, in clause 8, page 4, line 20, after ‘needs’, insert
‘, regardless of the circumstances in which it is found.’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 90, in clause 8, page 4, line 21, leave out ‘a suitable environment’ and insert
‘an adequate and comfortable living space’.
No. 192, in clause 8, page 4, line 26, leave out subsection (3).
No. 129, in clause 8, page 4, line 28, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert
‘, an animal’s environment and circumstances.’.

Shona McIsaac: The amendment is essential because the needs of an animal are the same, irrespective of the circumstances in which it is kept. The clause sets out five points that should be taken into account in all circumstances: the need for “a suitable environment” and “a suitable diet”, the ability to “exhibit normal behaviour” and the need “to be housed” and the need
“to be protected from pain, suffering, injury and disease.”
If we do not include the words “regardless of the circumstances”, the Bill might create a loophole for people who use practices that would otherwise be captured; it would create a lower welfare standard.
We must say from the outset that the standards in the clause are applicable to all the protected animals, regardless of the circumstances in which they are kept. I acknowledge that we might have to be careful as regards, say, police horses and the training of police dogs, but if we are not explicit, a loophole might be  created. I fear that that will be exploited by those who knowingly use cruel practices, particularly in training their animals.

Bill Wiggin: I suspect that we are going to receive a similar answer on these amendments. Amendment No. 90 will serve to clarify the ambiguity that the current wording presents. The term “suitable environment” is problematic because the Bill does not specify what constitutes a suitable environment. Although I understand that clause 10 makes provision for establishing regulations, we need to know what, in the Bill, the term is intended to mean. The dictionary defines an environment as
“the objects or the region surrounding anything”
and
“the conditions under which any person or thing lives or is developed; the sum-total of influences which modify and determine the development of life or character”.
That is quite ambiguous, too, and could present the judiciary with a problem in interpreting the law. We would all like to ensure that animals have comfortable surroundings. However, the only suitable environment for some animals would be their natural habitat. The Minister talked about hamsters.

Norman Baker: I sympathise with the direction in which the hon. Gentleman wishes to travel, but I am concerned that his definition is narrower than the Government’s wording. The term “suitable environment” would cover temperature, for example. I am not convinced that
“adequate and comfortable living space”
would deal with that issue. It is to do with the physical environment. The term used in the Bill seems more satisfactory.

Bill Wiggin: The hon. Gentleman has a valid point. I suspect that the Minister will tell us that this matter will be taken care of in the codes of practice—I would not be at all surprised if that was the case. With that in mind, I had a look at the draft cat code, which states:
 “Your cat must have fresh water available at all times.”
The phrase “at all times” is pretty clear. Of course, if a cat is being taken to the vet in a basket, or even in the back of an RSPCA van, it cannot necessarily have water available at all times. When drafting the codes, it will be extremely difficult to ensure that they are as comprehensive as possible.
 Amendment No. 129 would ensure that this important clause would be interpreted more widely than the present wording permits. In the present version, the circumstances to which it is relevant to have regard when applying subsection (1) are “lawful purposes” and “lawful activities”. The amendment widens that to include the animal’s environment and circumstances. If we take a single snapshot of how any animal is treated, we could find cause for complaint in our activities. One could argue that if someone places a cat in a box to take it to the vet, an offence is taking place while that cat is in the box. Nevertheless, the broader picture tells us that no offence is taking place and this amendment would make that explicit.

David Drew: I want specifically to speak to amendment No. 192, which is in my name. I tend to take the view, expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes and the hon. Member for Leominster, that we wish to clarify the terms by ensuring that they are as comprehensive as possible, rather than by narrowing them. I am afraid that we will seemingly be rehearsing positions for much of the rest of the proceedings.
This issue relates back to the draft Bill, which featured different wording. Subsection (3), which I wish to remove, has been added since the draft Bill was considered. The point is important because it relates to the basis on which somebody’s defence will be built if they are accused of cruelty towards an animal. The amendment is partly about consistency in animal protection standards. As far as the RSPCA is concerned—I am not paraphrasing the RSPCA completely accurately, but I think that this is a fair thing to say—it could drive a coach and horses through the Bill if someone argued that the reason they were keeping an animal was different from the norm. They might be keeping an animal to train it or for purely commercial reasons.
According to subsection (3), that at least gives them the excuse to treat that animal in a different way. Will the Minister explain why there has been a redefinition? Something has been included that was not in the draft Bill. Is the provision not somewhat dangerous, in that it gives people an opportunity to find an excuse for different gradations of how an animal should be treated? Effectively, we are talking about a second-class state of protection for certain animals.

Shona McIsaac: Would my hon. Friend acknowledge that some people involved in the training of animals use what most of us regard as quite cruel practices, but justify them by saying that they are necessary for the activity that the animal is trained to undertake?

David Drew: I largely agree; that is the point I am trying to make, in a nutshell. My hon. Friend put it more concisely than I have. I would go slightly further inasmuch as whether the provisions have been worded properly relates to how the courts determine matters. The last thing I want is for there to be a whole rash of cases where an excuse is made that the subsection is a justification for not treating animals in the normal way.
The provisions represent, in practice, the teeth of the Government’s argument concerning duty of care. If they are to bite—to continue that analogy—they must be made comprehensive, foolproof and fair. It will not be fair if the subsection makes possible an opportunity for those who treat animals in a certain way for a specific purpose to be subject to a different gradation of the law. No doubt the Minister will have something to say about that.

Norman Baker: I have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s point and hope that the Minister will reflect on it seriously. The clause is important—one of  the most important in the Bill—so we must ensure we get it absolutely right. Otherwise, we shall undo a lot of the Committee’s good work.
There appears to be an inconsistency in the clause, which follows the inclusion of subsection (3) to which the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) referred. We passed clause 3, which deals with responsibility for animals. It said that a reference to someone “responsible for an animal” meant that they were responsible whether that responsibility was permanent or temporary. We agree with that. We then considered clause 4, which dealt with unnecessary suffering in order that those responsible, whether temporarily or otherwise—the Minister gave some good examples—could be guilty of causing unnecessary suffering.
However, this clause contains a qualification that appears to limit those to whom the duty of care applies—at least that is how I read it. It should apply to everyone whether or not they hold an animal for a lawful purpose, but it muddies the waters and provides an inconsistency. It raises the possibility of an unwelcome and successful defence, which no one would want. The Bill would be better if subsection (3) were deleted. I am keen to understand why the Minister feels it should be included.

Ben Bradshaw: This is slightly reminiscent of our debate on Tuesday about the cruelty offence, particularly the issues concerning police horses and guard dogs. The Government are trying to make it clear that it would not be proportionate or reasonable to have an absolute welfare offence that did not take into account the circumstances of both the animal and the person responsible. That is the same whether one is talking about the welfare or the cruelty offence. Let me give a concrete example of why that is case in relation to welfare: farmed animals are kept to produce food. As a society, we believe that they should be kept in a manner that provides for their essential welfare needs, and codes of practice and secondary legislation cover most farm animals. However, I am not sure that members of the Committee would say that the welfare standards of farmed animals needed to be the same in all circumstances as those of pets, although some would say that they should be.
We take into account the purpose for which an animal is kept when we decide the appropriate legal standards, which is why it is absolutely right that their welfare should be assessed in that context. However, like the cruelty offence, that is not, to quote my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, an excuse or get-out but something that a court may want to take into consideration.

Greg Mulholland: That is a fair point, so why not specify farm animals, rather than having a clause that we fear would lead to a serious watering-down of the welfare offence, which the Committee agrees is the best part of the Bill?

Ben Bradshaw: Because to do so would still create an absolute measurement of the welfare offence, which would trap us into not being able to apply considerations of circumstance and proportionality.

Norman Baker: The Minister referred to the qualification in clause 4—he does not like the phrase “get-out clause”—which in a sense is a defence for those in the circumstances that the Minister is trying to deal with. Would not that give the necessary defence without further qualification in clause 8 of the type he referred to? In what circumstances would it be possible not to deliver the five freedoms in clause 8(2)? In what circumstances are they necessary? How can they possibly be deemed to be unnecessary?

Ben Bradshaw: I was coming to that. The hon. Gentleman is making my point, perhaps better than I have done, which is that for the purposes of the Act the person would still have to meet the needs of the animal, which are outlined in subsection (2). It allows the courts to take account of circumstances and proportionality when deciding whether an offence has been committed, rather than there being an absolute standard.

Shona McIsaac: My hon. Friend keeps going on about the circumstances, and I admit that they are mentioned in subsection (1). Why, then, is he so resistant to amendment No. 204?

Ben Bradshaw: If I understand my hon. Friend rightly, she is urging us to adopt a welfare offence that is absolute, regardless of circumstances.

Shona McIsaac: Regardless of the circumstances in which the animal is found.

Ben Bradshaw: I am arguing against that. It is not a sensible way forward, for the reasons I described.

Shona McIsaac: May I give my hon. Friend an example? An elephant is the same whether it is kept in a circus, a zoo or a sanctuary. That is why we must make it clear that the welfare standards should be absolute for that animal, or else different welfare standards will apply to one species.

Ben Bradshaw: My hon. Friend misses the point. This not a get-out or an excuse, it is about the circumstances and conditions that a court may take into account when considering whether the welfare needs of an animal have been met.

Shona McIsaac: So, if we take the example of a circus elephant or a large cat such as a tiger or a lion, subsection (3) would not provide a get-out for using sticks on those animals to train them to perform.

Ben Bradshaw: I am saying that, yes. My hon. Friend is wrong if she implies that arguing that what one is doing is lawful is consistent with the welfare offence. That is not the case. I suspect that we will debate circuses at some length later in our proceedings. I am not sure that I agree with her that every different species of animal needs the same sort of welfare in all circumstances. We would expect different sorts of welfare for a farmed llama from those for a llama in a zoo or a llama in a circus. She is urging an absolute welfare standard that takes no account of the circumstances, either of the animal or the person concerned.

Justine Greening: I am concerned that that seems entirely to contradict our previous discussion on good practice. The discussion seems to be validating exactly the position that many Members took which is that appropriateness would be far more flexible and give the Minister the flexibility that he says we require.

Ben Bradshaw: What we are talking about throughout the whole of the Bill is securing minimum welfare standards for our animals. We can continue to have an argument about whether we think “good practice” or “appropriate circumstances” is stronger. I happen to believe that “good practice” is stronger. But we are trying not to set an absolute welfare limit, regardless of the circumstances, either in which the animal is kept or of the human beings dealing with it.

Shona McIsaac: If the circumstances in which the animal is kept are such that the welfare standard cannot be met, surely the circumstances of that animal should be changed rather than our having a lower welfare standard. That is what the clause could end up doing.

Ben Bradshaw: No, I do not accept that at all. I could not have been clearer on this Bill. Both in pre-legislative scrutiny and on Second Reading, it was made clear that if the welfare standards of an animal cannot be met in a particular environment, that practice is banned. It will not happen. It will be challenged in court and it will stop. I do not think that I can be clearer.

Bill Wiggin: I may be able to help the Minister. The hon. Member for Cleethorpes wanted to identify whether the treatment of the elephant should be the same wherever it was. The Minister was saying that that is not what the Government want at all. The only reason I can think of why the Government should possibly not want that is that because at some stage it may be necessary to take the llama or the elephant to the vet. While it was travelling to the vet it could not have the same environment as where it lived permanently. Is that really what the Minister is saying, or have I misunderstood?

Ben Bradshaw: I beg his pardon, but the hon. Gentleman will have to make the point again.

Bill Wiggin: When the hon. Lady said that a llama or an elephant should live in the same situation irrespective of who owned it and what type of business they were running, or if the elephant or llama was travelling to the vet—

Norman Baker: The vet?

Bill Wiggin: Normally I would expect the vet to visit the elephant, but for the purposes of the example if the elephant was travelling, it would not be in the same circumstances and environment as it would be when it was home. I suspect that that is where the Minister wants some flexibility, which amendment No. 129 gives him.

Ben Bradshaw: If, like me, the hon. Gentleman is trying to make the point that we want good practice, not an absolute standard regardless of the circumstances, yes I agree.
Amendment No. 90 would limit the scope of the welfare offence. The court would not have to consider whether an owner or keeper had provided an animal with a suitable environment, but only whether he had provided the animal, as the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) said, with adequate and comfortable living space. Apart from adding the term “comfortable”, which is difficult to define, the amendment would exclude a court’s taking into account the absence of other aspects that had a significant impact on the animal’s welfare. For example, a dog kept in a backyard may have adequate and comfortable living space, but it would be exposed to the worst of the elements during summer and winter if the yard had no shelter. The Bill would thus fail to ensure that the welfare needs of the dog were fully met.
On amendments Nos. 192 and 129, I know that there are concerns that subsection (3) of clause 8 could give a person an absolute defence against the welfare offence, and that if someone could show that what they were doing was a lawful activity, or for a lawful purpose, they could not be found to have committed the welfare offence. That is not how subsection (3), in tandem with subsection (1), will function. As I said earlier, lawful purpose and lawful activity are circumstances to which it is relevant to have regard when applying subsection (1). Subsection (1) states that the person must
“take such steps as are reasonable in all the circumstances”,
and subsection (3) clarifies that the lawful purpose or activity should be taken into account, but that does not mean that they are an absolute defence, a get-out or an excuse.

Shona McIsaac: Will my hon. Friend give us some examples of circumstances that would constitute lawful purpose and lawful activity?

Ben Bradshaw: I find it difficult to do that off the top of my head. One example that my hon. Friend may like to consider is how the way that a pet horse is kept differs from the way in which horses for commercial purposes are kept. Horses like to be kept together in groups. [Interruption.] No, I am suggesting that as an example that my hon. Friend may like to consider. Would she want somebody prosecuted because they kept a pet horse on its own, which is not generally how horses like to live? I am not sure that she would. I am simply trying to get across the fact that there may be different welfare considerations in different circumstances, whether one is talking about pets, farmed animals, circus animals or zoo animals, and that we should not have an absolute welfare standard.

David Drew: I apologise for interrupting the Minister on this complicated issue. I accept entirely what he says about the situation of the animal, but I am more concerned about what is done to an animal because of the reason that it is kept or owned. That is the  difficulty. I am thinking of someone who mistreats an animal but says that it was for the animal’s good because the animal is meant to do a job. Those are the circumstances that I hope we might clarify a bit more—not the location but the use to which an animal is put, for training purposes and so on. Does my hon. Friend understand what I am trying to get at?

Ben Bradshaw: I think that I understand my hon. Friend. Some of his concerns will be met by a code of practice, or resolved by the common sense of the courts in considering whether behaviour was reasonable and proportionate, whether a lawful purpose needs to be taken into account and whether the treatment of the animal was excessive. If the treatment was excessive, the person would be likely to fall foul of the cruelty offence anyway.
 Amendment No. 204 attempts to ensure that the circumstances in which an animal is found would not be relevant in deciding what its needs are. As I said, we believe that is unnecessary. As the Bill is drafted, an animal’s circumstances are not considered in such decisions. Subsection (2) explains what the needs might include. Once the needs are established, it is necessary to consider whether the person took reasonable steps to meet them to the extent required by good practice, and that will be done taking into account all the circumstances. On that basis, I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Bill Wiggin: The Minister has been battling away on the difference between absolute and flexible standards, and I have enjoyed watching him wriggle. For my purposes, I am content that we may be all right.
However, the arguments seemed to fly very much in the face of the Bill’s purpose, which is to increase responsibility for animal welfare. To some extent, choosing flexibility means that the absolute duty for animal welfare is diminished. If the Minister can live with that, it is a shame, but I understand why. The drafting of this part of the Bill is extremely difficult, and Conservative Members have done our best to give him a great deal of help. He probably ought to go away and think about the matter; when he reads what he has said today, he may want to do that anyway. Should he wish to amend the Bill at a later date, we will all be sympathetic.

Shona McIsaac: The Minister has done a wonderful job in thoroughly confusing me as to what he is going on about, so I think that I will withdraw the amendment and go away and read what he said. I know what I am trying to get at with my amendment. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said, we do not want lower standards to be applied. There is worry about training, too. In addition, the provision in subsection (3) looks like a defence and a get-out, and the Minister could give me no concrete examples in relation to that situation.
I will reflect on the wording of my amendment, but I would like the Minister to reflect on what he has said today. Let us hope that we can come up with something, in this most important part of the Bill, that will not create a lower welfare standard for some animals; I feel that the subsection could inadvertently  end up doing that. I hope that the Minister will meet me to discuss the matter in more detail. On that basis, perhaps he would like to nod—he is not paying attention.

Hon. Members: Nod!
Mr. Bradshawindicated assent.

Shona McIsaac: It has been a long day, I know. I just said that if the Minister agrees to meet me to talk about the clause, so that we do not inadvertently create a lower standard for some animals, I will withdraw the amendment.

Ben Bradshaw: I am always happy to meet my hon. Friend.

Shona McIsaac: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 - Transfer of animals by way of sale or prize to persons under 16

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 9, page 4, line 38, leave out subsections (3) to (6) and insert—
‘(2A)A person commits an offence if he offers or gives an animal to another person as a prize.
(2B)A person does not commit an offence under subsection (2A) where the prize is offered or given in a family context.’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 169, in clause 9, page 4, line 38, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment No. 170, in clause 9, page 5, line 1, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment No. 16, in clause 9, page 5, line 6, at end insert
‘and who has responsibility for that person.’.
Amendment No. 171, in clause 9, page 5, line 7, leave out subsection (5).
Amendment No. 17, in clause 9, page 5, line 13, leave out subsection (6).
New clause 11—Transfer of animal by way of prize to any person—
‘(1)A person commits an offence if he enters into an arrangement with a person where that person has the chance to win an animal as a prize.
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), entering into an arrangement includes selling or transferring, or agreeing to sell or transfer, ownership of the animal in consideration of entry by the transferee into another transaction.’.

Norman Baker: This is another attempt to resurrect the draft Bill and reject the version before us. The amendments deal with the issue of pets as prizes. I do not pretend that the clause is the most important part of the Bill, although it is significant, but the subject has been covered, on and off, in the newspapers for a considerable time. If the papers are to be believed, views on the matter have been expressed by both the  Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. One cannot help feeling that the withdrawal of the proposals in the draft Bill reflects a wish on the part of Downing street not to be seen to be banning things. I hope that that is not the case.
To leave that to one side and look at the merits of the case for amendment No. 15, which I tabled with my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-West (Greg Mulholland), the Minister will know that there are no laws at present to prevent animals from being given as prizes. When we think of animals being given as prizes, we think of goldfish at fairs, but the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has on record cases of animals such as ponies and pigs being given as prizes. Obviously, there are significant welfare implications for such animals—as, indeed, there are for fish.

Bill Wiggin: The purpose of prizes is to encourage people to want to win them, so the case of pigs and ponies is very specific; many people would not want to enter a competition in which they would be lumbered with an animal that they did not want at the end, so I think that goldfish are the main concern.

Norman Baker: Goldfish are certainly the main animals given as prizes, but theoretically it is possible that a person who entered a raffle might end up being given some sort of animal. I imagine that in those circumstances the animal would not come with detailed guidance about how to look after it. Indeed, any attempt to impose such guidance on someone who had won a prize might be doomed to fail. It is hardly likely that someone will be told, “Congratulations, you have won a prize, now you must sign this code of conduct and agree to undertake these conditions before you can accept your prize.” I have never seen that occur.
When animals are given as prizes—particularly goldfish, as the hon. Gentleman said—they are often not treated seriously. There have been horrific examples of animals simply being discarded when they are not wanted. If someone wins an animal as a prize, it is at least possible that they had not anticipated getting that animal, had no wish to have it and have no knowledge of how to treat it. They might then discard it without a second thought for the consequences for the creature.
The Bill makes it an offence for a person to give away an animal as a prize to a child under 16 unless that child is accompanied by someone over 16. That offence is a new introduction since the draft Bill. There should be an absolute ban on the giving of pets as prizes, for the reasons that I have given. There can be no guarantee that even somebody over the age of 16 would deal responsibly with such a prize.
Without prejudice to amendment No. 15, amendment No. 16 would qualify the position set out in subsection (4)(b), which states that a person is permitted to give prizes to someone accompanied by a person over 16. There is no indication in that subsection of what the relationship might be between the person under 16 who is being given the prize and somebody over 16 who may happen to be with them.  The under-16-year-old could be accompanied, for example, by a 17-year-old friend who had no family connection with them or responsibility for them. There would thus be no guarantee that the person over 16 would exhibit any responsibility towards the person under 16 who was given a pet as a prize. The fact that a child happens to be with somebody over 16 is no defence; it will not ensure that the animal is properly cared for. That would be the case only if the person over 16 had responsibility for the one under 16; in other words, if they were a parent, guardian or of a similar relationship so that they could be held responsible. Otherwise, I can envisage somebody under 16, who happens to be accompanied by somebody who is 17, winning a prize and then behaving irresponsibly. How could one hold the person over 16 responsible in that situation? It would not wash.
Amendment No. 17 is intended to seek clarification from the Minister on the phrase “in a family context”. I notice that the amendment is supported by the hon. Members for Leominster and for Stroud, who may also want to speak to it. I am concerned about what the phrase means, and would welcome clarification on that point. Although the phrase may be useful, it is nevertheless helpful to explore in Committee what the Minister understands by it. It may mean that it would be normal behaviour, for example, for a parent to give a child a dog or cat for Christmas. They may do so responsibly, giving the child good guidance and ensuring that the animal is properly cared for. Nobody wants to eliminate such activity, and we are making no attempt to do so.
The phrase “in a family context”, however, could be deemed to mean something less satisfactory. It could mean, for example, that a distant aunt, uncle or cousin could give a dog or cat to someone who was not expecting it and had no wish to have it, which would mean that the consequences of giving an animal as a prize would apply. There would be no follow-through or guidance, and the person who gave the animal might simply disappear after Christmas lunch and never reappear on the scene. The phrase “in a family context” needs more exploration to ensure that it relates to a continuing relationship allowing continuous care for the animal, not to the temporary context of someone not in the immediate family who will not necessarily have any interest in the animal or even in the person under 16 to whom they have given it.

Bill Wiggin: Amendments Nos. 169, 170 and 171 are probing amendments that have been suggested by the Kennel Club. Along with the British Veterinary Association, the club was concerned that the Bill would leave under-16s still able to win prizes. It pointed out that, although the sale of animals to under-16s is banned, it is contradictory to have a situation in which, when accompanied by an adult, under-16s can win an animal as a prize.
To resolve that situation, the club wants to ban the giving away of any animal as a prize, which is why it has asked for subsections (3), (4) and (5) to be removed. Alternatively, it would like clarification, which I hope that the Minister can provide. My understanding is that the intention of the Bill is that there always be an adult over 16 responsible for any animal. I hope that the Minister can confirm, despite the unclear wording of the clause, that its intention is not that under-16s be obstructed from looking after an animal, but that the ultimate responsibility should be with an adult. We want to encourage young people to take responsibility for animals, but we want adults to take responsibility for those young people’s activities.
I once won a goldfish at a fair, and that is what triggered my fascination with fish that ended up with my being a volunteer keeper at London zoo aquarium. Unfortunately, at a similar fair, I noticed young people dropping bags of goldfish from the big wheel and, at that point, I recognised that the number of enthusiasts created by winning a goldfish as a prize is far lower than the number of acts of cruelty that may follow from such prizes. That is why I support the Bill on that point.
There seems to be a loophole in the Bill that would enable people classed as family to transfer ownership of an animal to a person under the age of 16. As drafted, the Bill would leave the courts with a problem as to the definition of a family. Would it include non-blood relatives or situations in which a child lives in foster care? There are wide-ranging and diverse definitions of family, so it may be unwise to include such a subsection. As the hon. Member for Lewes said, people may appear on the scene, accompany a child, and then disappear. Without the subsection, children would still be able to care for pets, but responsibility would remain with an appropriate adult. Why should one rule apply to one set of people and not to another? Amendment No. 17, which I believe that we proposed in parallel, would ensure legal consistency and prevent any confusion around the child ownership of animals.

David Drew: The arguments have been well made, and I accept from the outset that new clause 11, in my name, is less preferable than amendment No. 15 in the name of the hon. Member for Lewes. As has already been mentioned, we are looking at a relaxation of the position in the draft Bill, inasmuch as I thought that we were trying—which is difficult because the law cannot do everything—to eliminate the notion that a pet is anything other than a responsible motivation in somebody’s life when they are given one or when they purchase one. However, the idea of pets as prizes goes contrary to the idea of responsibility and parades the worst aspects of prurience, in that one may use animals as a gimmick.
To return to the point about goldfish, that illustrates most simply what is wrong; it must be wrong to give something as a prize that could never be cared for, because the vast majority of people do not have the means to deal with it in the necessary time. I hope that we will tighten that up and I am happy to listen to what is said, but I think that it is repugnant in this day and  age to continue to allow prizes—rather than giving—in the context of an Animal Welfare Bill that is designed to promote responsible pet ownership.

Philip Hollobone: I very much would like to support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Lewes, and I hope that he presses it to its conclusion, or that the Minister gives ground. We are now in the 21st century, and I do not think that the great British public want it to be legal to give animals as prizes, and if the Bill is about anything, it is about giving animals dignity.
The Committee will know that, at present, there are no laws preventing animals from being given as prizes. We all know that the animals most commonly given as prizes are fish, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster said, other animals such as ponies, puppies and fish are also given away. A number of local authorities have introduced a policy of not allowing animals to be given as prizes at any fundraising activities held on or in council-owned land or buildings. Sadly, one local authority—I am sure that there are others—has reported seeing a young boy winning a fish at a fairground, then flicking his friends with the water and proceeding to throw the fish on the ground and drive over it in a dodgem car.
The alteration of the clause from the draft Bill is a serious weakening of the Bill, which, as we appreciate, has the concept of responsible animal ownership at its heart. The winning of an animal by chance does not allow the prospective owner sufficient opportunity to find out about the needs of the animal, make the necessary preparations for it, or to assess their ability and commitment to care for it. The individual obtains the animal through chance, rather than as a result of making a conscious, informed decision. The prize winner may not have had any prior experience of caring for the species and is unlikely to have the appropriate environment to house it, especially in the short term. Attempts by the prize giver, if any are made, to impose conditions for the animal’s care, are unlikely to be effective. It seems incongruous that the Bill, as drafted, allows a child under 16 to acquire an animal as a prize provided an over 16-year-old is present, but prohibits a child under 16 from purchasing an animal, whether or not so accompanied.

Greg Mulholland: I am delighted to hear the strong support for banning, at last, the giving away of pets as prizes, including goldfish. Hon. Members may be aware that that has been Liberal Democrat party policy for some time, and something for which certain people from other parties used to mock the Liberal Democrats. However, I am sure that that does not apply to any hon. Members present today. It is an important issue in terms of the balance, which is always there, between individual liberty and, with this Bill, the rights of animals. I hope that, at last, we may be able to come down on the right side on the matter.
I welcome this clause and thoroughly welcome making it illegal to sell pets to under 16-year-olds; it a welcome step forward. However, the clause is thoroughly confused and muddled in its intent, because it involves two separate issues. There is the  issue of not selling pets to under 16-year-olds, and that of not giving away pets as prizes. I disagree with the conclusions of the hon. Member for Stroud. I think that he was right in the first place: this should be a separate clause in the Bill, because it is a significant issue.
There is a need for people who look after animals to have a sense of responsibility: it is a choice of individual liberty. There are positive parts of the Bill that deal with that, although there are areas where it could be dealt with better. However, if the Bill believes in the duty of care, it must promote responsible pet ownership, which cannot happen while we continue with the position in which pets can be given away as prizes, where people have not requested them, do not necessarily want them and certainly have no idea about how to care for them. The only way to resolve the issue is simply to ban outright all pets being given as prizes. I hope that the Minister will seriously consider that.

Justine Greening: I wish to add my support to these amendments, because I think that in the 21st century, it is time that we banned giving pets away as prizes. I am sure that, every year, many parents are greeted by the horrific scene of their children returning with friends from a fair with a pet fish. The parents then wonder how on earth they are meant to take care of it. It is an involuntary, unacceptable and unnecessary way of becoming an owner.
Although my normal instincts would be to ban as little as possible because I do not like to interfere in people’s lives, animals cannot make the choice about whether they are prizes, so there is a need to legislate. It is time that the Bill stood as a whole, which means ensuring that we protect animal welfare as well as we can. Therefore, banning pets as prizes is appropriate.

Ben Bradshaw: Amendments Nos. 15 and 169 to 171 seek to remove the minimum age restriction of 16 years at which a person can win an animal as a prize. Amendment No. 15 and new clause 11 seek to replace the restriction with a complete prohibition on the giving away of animals as prizes. The proposed age restriction in the Bill is consistent with the prohibition in the clause on the selling of animals to persons under 16 years. I am pleased that the Committee has widely welcomed that. The clause also rectifies an anomaly in existing legislation whereby a child under the age of 12 cannot purchase an animal as a pet, but an unaccompanied child of any age may win one as a prize.
I understand the motives of those who wish to see a complete ban on the giving of an animal as a prize; however, the Government believe that it would be overly intrusive of them to dictate that an adult is not capable of making the informed and responsible decision that he or she is able to care for an animal on offer. The hon. Member for Leominster gave a couple of examples from his own experience of animals that are given at agricultural shows. There has been no mention of other examples, such as teenage girls entering gymkhana competitions for which the prize is a pony.

Bill Wiggin: And racehorses.

Ben Bradshaw: And racehorses. The Government did not feel that it was proper to interfere in that right and that process, as long as the ultimate responsibility is taken by the adult.

Norman Baker: Of course adults are responsible and able to make decisions, but an adult going to a shop or wherever to purchase an animal has taken a conscious decision to take responsibility for, and look after, the animal. The adult has a good chance—I hope—of identifying the animal’s needs before they take the decision to purchase. The situation is entirely different if the animal is given as a prize. In certain circumstances, the parents may have entered a competition knowing that an animal would be given, but it is equally possible that they will have been given an animal without expecting or being prepared to win.

Ben Bradshaw: The circumstances that the hon. Gentleman described at the end of his remarks would be highly unusual. In the vast majority of the very few cases, such as gymkhanas and agricultural shows, where this practice occurs, the people who have entered the competitions are well aware of the prize being offered. I shall come on to what would happen if they were not.

Justine Greening: The Minister makes a valuable point. The parents may be aware, but they may not expect to win. Parents who are pressured into participating by their small children may end up with a nasty shock when their ticket is drawn out of the bag.

Ben Bradshaw: Again, the question is about how far the state should intervene in the decision of an adult. Unusually for the hon. Lady and myself, I take a more libertarian position than she does. She says that she does not like banning things, but she is a bit of a banner on this issue, if I may say so.
I should highlight that the Bill places a duty on those responsible for animals to take steps to ensure that their welfare needs are met. That will include those people looking after animals that will be given as prizes, and those people who also win an animal or are responsible for a child who wins an animal as a prize.
Turning to amendment No. 17, the purpose of subsection (6) is to allow a prize to be offered in a family context—for example, from one family member to another, as a reward or a prize for good work: “If you do well in your exams, I will buy you a gerbil.” The Government should not regulate such harmless arrangements within families. There is no justification for interfering in an arrangement when the person who will be held legally responsible for the care of the animal on the child’s behalf can be assumed to be aware of the arrangement and to have taken responsibility for ensuring that the welfare needs of the animal will be met.
Amendment No. 16 seeks to ensure that if an animal is given away as a prize to a child accompanied by a person over the age of 16, that person must be responsible for the child. I suspect that hon. Members  are aiming to ensure that the accompanying adult must also be a parent or guardian or someone to whom the parent or guardian had clearly delegated responsibility. I acknowledge that this is a difficult issue and we have had to balance the welfare needs of animals with the role of the state in interfering with the choices and behaviour of individuals. Under the Bill, clearly a parent or guardian takes ultimate responsibility—this goes back to clause 3—for animals looked after by children for whom they are responsible. However, that parent or guardian may delegate responsibility by allowing a child to go away for a weekend to stay with an uncle, godfather or friend, for example. That uncle, godfather or friend then has actual care and control of the child temporarily and under clause 3 assumes responsibility for any animal the child has with them during the stay.

Norman Baker: I understand that point, which is fair in that circumstance, but does the Minister agree that the clause allows a circumstance to arise in which a person over 16 may have no connection and no responsibility, temporarily or otherwise, for that person? They could just be a friend.

Ben Bradshaw: Even if they were just a friend, they would still have temporary responsibility under clause 3 because, as the person over 16 present, they would be in charge of the animal.
In the scenario that we are considering, the circumstances are more varied and, for example, when the child plays a fairground game, the care and control of that child may, as the hon. Gentleman said, temporarily and wholly or partly be with the adult accompanying them. It will depend on the circumstances, but in any case the court would decide exactly which adult was responsible for the child and thus the animal. That adult would be responsible for the welfare of any animal won in a game unless and until the child and the animal returned to the care of another adult who was usually responsible for the child.

Angela Smith: Are we arguing that when children take pets into school the teacher would be in charge of the pets while they were in the classroom? Taking pets to school is quite common practice and teachers in school are in loco parentis.

Ben Bradshaw: If I may, I will write to my hon. Friend with a proper legalistic response. This is sticky territory, but my guess is that the answer is yes because, as she said, the school is in loco parentis and the adults in the school would have temporary charge of the child who brought the animal. If I am wrong, I will write to my hon. Friend and correct that for the record—[Interruption.] I have an instant response. Only those with actual care and control of a person under 16 would have responsibility—that is not actually helpful. I will write to my hon. Friend and copy my letter to the Committee.
While I sympathise with the motives behind the amendment, I believe that it would be disproportionate. An adult is already responsible for any animal that is won and could be guilty of an  offence if its welfare needs are not met. The amendment might place unnecessary restrictions on who might accompany a child at a fairground at which an animal could be won. For example, an older brother who has been told that he can take his younger brother to play a game and that if he wins a goldfish, he should bring it back to perhaps an uncle or aunt to be looked after would no longer be able to do that even though everyone was acting responsibly.

Greg Mulholland: I will issue a direct challenge to the Minister. He has outlined situations in which there might be justification for winning animals as prizes. I do not agree with that, but he made a good case on gymkhanas and so on. However, the situation concerning goldfish at fairs is complicated, so will he adopt Liberal Democrat policy and specifically ban the giving away of goldfish at fairs?

Ben Bradshaw: I hate to disappoint the hon. Gentleman. I was not aware that that was still Liberal Democrat policy, but I am pleased to hear that it is. I seem to recall—perhaps I am wrong—one or two senior members of the Liberal Democrat party arguing that that was exactly the sort of policy that brought the party into disrepute. However, I am pleased that it is still their policy. I do not recall seeing it in the manifesto, but I stand to be corrected if the goldfish ban was in the manifesto.

Norman Baker: I am the member of my party responsible for animal welfare policy, and that is still Liberal Democrat policy from our last policy paper on animals.

Ben Bradshaw: But it is not in the manifesto.

Paddy Tipping: There are many Liberal Democrat policies that they dare not put in the manifesto.

Ben Bradshaw: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. In a moment, I shall say something about goldfish that has not been mentioned; I hope that it will reassure the Committee.
The amendment would make an unreasonable demand on the stallholder to reach a conclusion about the relationship between an adult and a child every time the child competed for a prize. The last thing that a stallholder at a funfair would want to do is to start questioning adults about the degree of their responsibility for the child.
Members of the Committee have overlooked the fact that goldfish, too, would be subject to the welfare legislation. Organisations such as the RSPCA might like to test whether keeping a goldfish in a small plastic bag on a funfair stall for a long time would be compatible with its welfare. I suggest that provisions in the Bill might affect that long-standing Liberal Democrat party commitment.

Bill Wiggin: It would be very difficult to test the keeping of fish in polythene bags. The Minister should be aware that fish imported to this country often come  in polythene bags packed inside polystyrene cases. The RSPCA, or anyone else who tried to test such a thing, would find it very difficult.

Ben Bradshaw: We will leave that to the courts.

Bill Wiggin: I am troubled by the idea of giving goldfish as prizes. It is probably unnecessary in this day and age. As my hon. Friend the Member for Putney said, people who win them find that the ownership is thrust upon them; they did not volunteer for or want it. It is a difficult area. I had hoped that the definitions would have been tidied up, but the Minister has not done so sufficiently. I also look forward to hearing what the Liberal Democrats would do; my recollection is that they would not allow under 16-year-olds to own goldfish.

Norman Baker: I will go backwards over our three amendments and first deal with amendment No. 17. Unless I missed it, the Minister did not clarify what is meant by “a family context”, and whether it opened the possibility of a distant family member giving another family member a pet, and subsequently not being in a position to exercise responsibility. I will leave that with him for a moment; he may want to intervene on me at some point.
I understand the Minister’s comments on amendment No. 16. He has a case, but so do I. The fact that, legally and technically speaking, a 16-year-old who accompanies a school friend who is 15, is responsible for the animal given to the 15-year-old, is meaningless. Any attempt to make that person responsible would not wash—assuming of course that our 16 and 17-year-olds are so up to date with the law that they would be aware of their position. I ask the Minister to look at that issue again. The link between someone who is responsible for a person, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, is important, but I do not believe that someone who happens to be a school friend, who might be just a few months older, can be deemed to be responsible.
The main point of the debate is the giving of pets as prizes. I am not entirely convinced by the Minister’s case. I accept that the situation is not as black and white as some would have us believe. Raising the issue of gymkhanas or whatever was fair enough, but the point that the hon. Member for Putney made in her intervention was equally fair—that even if people are fully aware of the prize on offer and desire it at the time, they may be totally unprepared for receiving it and may not genuinely want it. It is perfectly possible for a parent under pressure to say, “All right, I’ll buy a raffle ticket for you,” and be totally surprised, and almost disappointed, to be successful. That is very different from marching into an establishment and purchasing an animal, when the matter will have been fully weighed up, all considerations taken into account, preparations made and the necessary care for the animal considered. None of that may have been done if an animal is being given as a prize.

Bill Wiggin: I have been racking my brains to think of an occasion when someone might want to win such a prize. A racehorse is probably the only example I can  think of. Someone might be an owner for a race and never meet the horse. Certainly, if it does not win, they would never meet it in the winner’s enclosure. I am not sure whether that sort of prize would be covered. What does the hon. Gentleman think?

Norman Baker: If I were the Minister, that is the example that I would be trying to push, because, frankly, it is the one with the most credibility. Someone who wins a race horse is likely—not always—to be in a position where it is cared for. There may well be other racehorses and stabling arrangements already in place. That could possibly be an acceptable arrangement, but it is difficult to find an alternative example that justifies the giving of animals as prizes. It may well be that there should be an arrangement whereby someone who enters a competition for a prize needs to demonstrate that they are capable of dealing with the animal in the event that they win it. That might be an alternative approach that commends itself to the Minister. There are alternative ways forward.
We have heard that there is disquiet about the giving of fish—that was the example given—and, essentially, about circumstances that apply when animals are given almost as an afterthought and are not considered by those who are trying to score less than 21 when playing cards or to throw a dart, or whatever they are doing at fairgrounds, and are suddenly successful and get given a fish. That is the first time that they think about it. They do not want to bother taking the fish home. They want to go on the big wheel or the dodgem cars. The last thing that they want to do is wander around with a goldfish in their hands for an hour and a half, so it gets thrown away.
The Minister has said nothing about how that would be dealt with, other than to mention a theoretical case that the RSPCA might bring—it shows no indication of wishing to do so—relating to whether the goldfish is kept adequately by the person behind the stall. Even if it is kept adequately by the person behind the stall, it does not necessary follow that it will be cared for after it is given away.

Justine Greening: The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. The Bill focuses on prevention, which is why I am in favour of the amendments. The point is preventing animal welfare issues from arising in the first place. A pet as a prize is by definition an unexpected occurrence. Surely the risk that it carries of somebody who is ill prepared becoming an owner and of animal welfare suffering as a result is something that we want to minimise, rather than allow to persist.

Norman Baker: That is right. I want to pick up on a phrase that the hon. Lady used: the winning of a prize is an unexpected occurrence. The Minister shook his head at that point. Unless he is fiddling with the draw, of course winning a prize is an unexpected occurrence. Presumably, a large number of people will enter the draw. Normally, the sale of the tickets covers the cost of the prize. Of course it is unexpected to win a prize,  because the chances of doing so are pretty minimal. By definition, people have an expectation that they will not win and so they are not prepared when they do.
 The Minister came up with a reasonably good draft Bill in this respect. It made a lot of sense in terms of animal welfare and it held together. Then there was a reaction, beyond his Department, from the Prime Minister and others, who do not like the word “ban”. None of us likes the word “ban” as a matter of fact.

Bill Wiggin: It was in your manifesto.

Norman Baker: No, as a Liberal, I do not like the word “ban”, but there are occasions when a ban is necessary. A reaction against the word “ban” has moved the pendulum far too far so that on occasions when a ban is justified, Ministers pull back from imposing one. They need to reflect further on that.
I shall not press the amendment to a vote, as I intend to bring it back on Report. I believe that there is wider support in the Commons than the Minister appears to think, and I do not want to lose the opportunity to achieve something. For that reason, and that reason alone, I shall withdraw the amendment, but I ask the Minister, who I hope is doing a great deal of reflecting today, to reflect on the comments from both sides of the room—from Conservative Members, from Members of my party and, indeed, from his own colleagues. To sum up the debate, there is support for a ban of some sort on giving pets as prizes.
If the Minister has not drawn that conclusion, he has misheard the comments of his colleagues and others. I hope that he will seriously consider what further action needs to be taken, and that he will do so on the basis of animal welfare, rather than trying to turn this into a party point-scoring matter, as he unfortunately seems to be doing. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Hon. Members: No.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided:  Ayes 5, Noes 10.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Regulations to promote welfare

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in clause 10, page 5, line 18, at end insert—
‘(1A)Provisions promoting the welfare of animals under subsection (1) may only be made if the appropriate national authority is satisfied, on the basis of public scientific evidence, that those provisions are in fact necessary to promote such welfare.’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 75, in clause 10, page 5, line 26, after ‘more’, insert ‘independent, expert’.
No. 76, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, after ‘to’, insert ‘scientific’.

Bill Wiggin: The amendment seeks to clarify the regulatory framework that will follow enactment and to set statutory requirements for the consultation process beforehand. This part of the Bill has attracted much criticism from within and outside Parliament. Many criticisms relate to the unclear nature of the powers that bodies established under future regulations could have. Other concerns relate to the fact that nothing in the Bill guarantees that regulations will be made on the basis of scientific evidence and fact. Including such a provision would follow the precedent in clause 1(4).
Amendment No. 75 seeks to ensure that any bodies that are created under the Bill with functions concerning advice on animal welfare are expert and independent. The Bill does not clarify the nature or composition of the bodies that will be established under subsection (2)(c). I am concerned that, unless it is made clear by statute that they must be expert and independent, they may become mere tools of charities or persons with prejudices. For instance, if those sitting on such bodies had past links with organisations that have certain prejudices about animal welfare, a conflict of interest could arise and questions would be asked. It is true that a degree of flexibility is required when making regulations, but they must be made on the basis of sound and objective science, and by persons whose integrity and independence are beyond question.
Amendment No. 76 seeks to guarantee that regulations made under the clause are done on the basis of science. That is not clear in this clause, whereas clause 1(4) makes it clear that decisions about the animals to be covered by the Bill should be made on the basis of scientific evidence.
On Second Reading, when justifying the need for the Bill, the Secretary of State eloquently stated that existing laws have failed to keep up with scientific advances. Clearly, if the Bill has been drafted in the spirit of science, I see no reason why that should not be stated when it comes to making decisions that are essentially scientific. Therefore the amendment is in keeping with the spirit of science engendered in other parts of the Bill and the comments made by the Secretary of State.

Ben Bradshaw: Clause 10 provides powers for the appropriate national authority to make regulations for the purpose of promoting animal welfare. The amendments seek to restrict that power in what we believe is an inappropriate manner. Amendment No. 73 is unnecessary as neither national authority would attempt to introduce a regulation unless it was satisfied that that was necessary to promote animal welfare.
The reference to “scientific advice” could have the effect of preventing the authority from making a regulation even when there was good cause to do so. While we will, of course, take into account the latest scientific evidence when assessing the level of regulation that should apply to a particular activity, there are other issues—we have already discussed good practice—that we will also want to consider. The amendment would not allow the appropriate national authority to consider those.

Bill Wiggin: Could the Minister or his officials come up with an example of where a national authority might want to legislate without the support of scientific advice?

Ben Bradshaw: I am not saying that we would want to legislate without the support of scientific advice, but that is not the only criterion that would need to be taken into account. Indeed, we have had discussions about where we draw the line in the definition of “animal”. It is the nature of life that science is sometimes uncertain; there are grey areas and there are boundaries. A future Government may wish to take a decision based on good practice where there is no hard and fast scientific advice available.
Amendment No. 76 suffers from a similar defect. We do not think that it would be sensible to restrict a body established under clause 10 to advising only on scientific matters. Although a large proportion of any such advice may well be of a scientific nature, we do not see any benefit in restricting the role of the bodies in such a way. An appropriate national authority may at some time want a body to advise on the social or other aspects of animal welfare and it would not be clear under the amendment that it would be able to do that.
The Government do not consider amendment No. 75 to be necessary. In deciding to establish organisations to offer advice on animal welfare, the relevant national authority would wish to consider the relevant expertise of the organisation concerned, so I do not believe that it is necessary to include such a reference in subsection (2). As long as a body possesses the relevant expertise and has the resources to carry out the work, I am not convinced that it necessarily needs to be independent, although obviously that is sometimes essential.
However, the need to ensure absolute independence of a body from Government, animal keeping, or any other animal interest, may unnecessarily restrict the relevant national authority’s ability to appoint an appropriate body to carry out that work. Furthermore, consultation, pre-legislative scrutiny where appropriate, and parliamentary debate as part of the affirmative procedure set out in clause 55 would  ensure that any proposals from the Secretary of State are fully debated in an open and transparent fashion. This will also help to ensure that inappropriate or unnecessary regulations would not be introduced. On that basis I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Bill Wiggin: The Minister made a fair point on some of these amendments, but I am very unhappy that he has abandoned the vital role of scientific evidence. I hope that he is right. I have made the point repeatedly that we must stick to the science because that is the only way we can justify some of the changes that we want to bring about. I understand why he said what he said. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Drew: I beg to move amendment No. 194, in clause 10, page 5, line 22, at end insert—
‘(aa)make provision for the specification of certain training methods and devices to be used in the training of animals,’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 199, in clause 10, page 5, line 22, at end insert—
‘(aa)make provision imposing prohibitions (including provision making exception from a prohibition);’.
No. 201, in clause 10, page 5, line 22, at end insert—
‘(aa)make provision for licensing when or under what circumstances it is permissible to release game birds and wild fowl into the wild;’.
No. 159, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
‘(d)make provision to enable a person who has an abandoned animal in their care to seek an order from the courts establishing legal ownership of the abandoned animal.’.
No. 193, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
‘(d)make provision regarding the treatment of animals which have been abandoned, including power to authorise that such animals be taken into possession by a local authority or a body with functions relating to the care of animals;
(e)make provision for prohibiting the keeping of animals of a specified kind in specified circumstances;
(f)make provision for prohibiting the use of animals of a specified kind for a specified purpose;
(g)make provision that where an authorised person considers that animals are being kept in a way which is likely to cause unnecessary pain, suffering or injury, or in which their needs are not being met in contravention of section 8, he may serve a notice on the person appearing to him to be in charge of, or responsible for, the animals requiring that person, within the period stated in the notice, to take any action that the authorised person considers to be reasonably necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Act and the authorised person shall give his reasons for requiring that action to be taken.
In this paragraph “an authorised person” means a person authorised by the Secretary of State or by the local authority.’.

David Drew: I am pleased to be able to speak to this group of amendments. The nature of the clause leads us to seek clarity from the Government, but I will not divide the Committee on the amendment. Some issues were clearer in the draft Bill, and we want to get the  wording right. I want to draw out the Minister’s thoughts on this part of the Bill, and I shall listen carefully to what he has to say.

Anne Snelgrove: Thank you for your explanatory comments, Mr. Gale, which I, as a new Member, found most helpful.
Amendment No. 201 is primarily concerned with the welfare of game birds and wild fowl bred for shooting, and the effect of their release on the health of wild birds. I enjoy the products of shoots so it would be hypocritical of me to be anti-shooting and I do not wish the amendment to be seen as such. However, the licensing of release would help shoots.
There is a secondary issue in addition to the welfare of the birds involved: the potential risk to human and animal health in light of concerns about avian flu. Licensing on the release of game birds would ensure that it could be better regulated.

Bill Wiggin: The hon. Lady’s opening remarks were very welcome. She will be aware that everyone who goes on shoots is already licensed because they have a gun. She will also be aware that the time period for release would be quite short. The most important thing is that the people engaged in these sports are also targets for animal welfare nutters, therefore making the information public puts them at risk.

Anne Snelgrove: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments but I do not necessarily agree with him. The licensing of individuals who have guns is one thing; the licensing of the release of game birds is different—it relates to shoots.
The amendment would give officials the power to decide in what circumstances the birds can be released into the wild. We may need better regulation, relating not just to the health of wild birds but to the health of people and animals. Sometimes we can see that there are artificially high numbers of birds released into the wild in a short space of time, as the hon. Gentleman said. That increases the risk of infection, especially in connection with mallards, which inhabit ponds where there are other domestic or wild fowl. There is no official record of the number of mallards released into the wild, although the Game Conservancy Trust suggested that on average it is just under 35,000 a year. That is a huge number of birds and it causes difficulties for the welfare of both sets of birds.
The British Veterinary Association identified ducks as being the greatest risk of avian flu in this country; they show no sign that they have avian flu, but that is a second issue.The intensive rearing of game birds and wild fowl may produce birds that are unable to survive in the wild for adequately long periods. This is a probing amendment, as there are several licensing issues in respect of game birds being released into the wild which I hope the Minister will reconsider before Report.

Bill Wiggin: First, 35,000 ducks is a very small number. There are several farms in my constituency which have more than 1 million chickens at any one  time. Secondly, the ducks about which the hon. Lady is worried—the ones that may carry avian flu—are wild ducks coming from Russia rather than tame ducks released domestically or for shooting. Finally, for ducks to be of a shootable quality they must be looked after properly and able to fly sufficiently well. Their welfare standards do not therefore present a risk. She is right to be worried about the problem of avian flu, but in this case the worry is not justified.
Amendment No. 159 is designed to help those who take abandoned animals into their care to become the legal owner of those animals. The Bill makes no provision for the rehoming of animals, other than that in clause 18(1)(b). Many organisations and individuals do such noble work, and we should recognise their wish to become the owners of the animals in question. That position is supported by the International League for the Protection of Horses. We must ensure that the process is smooth and consistent manner, and that there is a reasonable period before such transfer of ownership can take place. That would avoid the case of an owner, having gone on holiday and left their animals in someone else’s care, being unaware of the animals’ new circumstances.
Additionally, in the event of kennels being closed down under the Bill, time will be needed to locate the owners of the affected animals before the transfer of ownership. The amendment would enable regulations—possibly different ones for different animals—to establish criteria and responsibilities for those who want to care for animals in such a situation.
The issue of rehoming is important. I have received all sorts of horrid and heart-wrenching stories about rehoming, and the rules for dogs seem different from those for horses. I suspect that that is where problems arise. I received an e-mail today, from someone who experienced the agony of losing a cat, on the speed at which animals can be rehomed. A week or two can fly by. That person took a long time to come to terms with losing a pet. When they returned home they walked around putting up posters, giving out leaflets and talking to neighbours and cat collectors. They experienced the frustration of people taking delight in sending them further into the depths of despair by telling them off for not having a cat collar, chip or similar.
We need to clarify the process of rehoming. We want abandoned animals to be rehomed as quickly as possible, but we do not want a rehoming regime that is too draconian and causes people undue misery or, worse still, causes them to find that their animal has been rehomed nearby and they are not legally able to get it back. The amendment is intended to draw the issue to the Government’s attention. It is an important point and I hope that the Minister will be able to say some constructive and helpful things, particularly about the rehoming of horses. The period before which horses become eligible for rehoming can be very long. Equally, it is awful when people lend their animal to someone for the period of their holidays, misleading that person into thinking that they are rehoming it. As  soon as they return they claim the animal back and cause a great deal of suffering for people who had genuinely good intentions.

Ben Bradshaw: I shall deal first with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Anne Snelgrove). I am advised that clause 11 provides powers to license the release of birds. As she will know from our discussions on Tuesday, or perhaps on Second Reading, there is a planned code of practice that will cover game rearing and consider such issues. On the health risk from avian flu, I believe that if a game farm were within the area of an outbreak, immediate restrictions would, for animal health reasons, be put on any release. I hope that that addresses the concerns that she expressed.
On amendment No. 159 and proposed subsection (4)(d) in amendment No. 193, I am aware of the concerns about abandoned animals. My officials have worked closely with animal welfare organisations responsible for sanctuaries, for which, as hon. Members know, we propose to introduce a registration scheme. Representatives of sanctuaries have talked to my officials about some of the difficulties, which include the transfer of ownership of stray abandoned animals and the problems that can arise when the original owner, who may have failed to care for the animal properly, attempts to reclaim it. I can assure hon. Members that my officials intend to explore the matter further and that clause 10 provides sufficient power to make secondary legislation if it is decided that regulation is necessary.
Proposed paragraph (d) in amendment No. 193 is more wide-ranging but, again, the clause allows regulations to be made regarding the taking in of animals for welfare reasons. We also propose that guidance relating to the care of animals in sanctuaries, including their rehabilitation, will be dealt with through the welfare codes. The contents of a code will be subject to wide consultation, taking in sanctuaries, welfare organisations and others interested in wildlife matters. On proposed paragraphs (e) and (f), I can assure hon. Members that the clause contains sufficient power to make regulations concerning the relevant matters.
On proposed paragraph (g), I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud for raising the point regarding the provision of a system of discretionary improvement notices. We consider that clause 10 already allows for that. It includes, in subsection (3)(f), the power
“to make incidental, supplementary, consequential or transitional provision or savings”.
I take the view that the provision about enforcement is incidental to regulations to promote welfare and does not need to be spelled out. Indeed, regulations on the welfare of farmed animals include a power to issue improvement notices, which we want to retain. However, there are further amendments on improvement notices to be reached later in our deliberations, so if I may, I shall say a few words on the matter now.
As we all know, prosecutions for animal welfare offences are brought by a variety of bodies. The mains ones are the state veterinary service, local authorities and the RSPCA. Under the Bill, it will continue to be possible for the RSPCA to prosecute and for private persons to prosecute, although that is rare. That gives rise to special difficulties with devising a system of improvement notices. The RSPCA has indicated that it will issue written advice before prosecuting, which we welcome. One important consideration is whether failure to observe an improvement notice should in itself be an offence. In other words, should the notice have teeth? If it does, we need to consider whether there should be a right of appeal against the notice. The situation then becomes administratively burdensome for the enforcement agency.

Bill Wiggin: I have strong feelings about this issue. There are now offences in respect of both cruelty and the duty of care, whereas previously there was only one. When it comes to duty of care, an improvement notice would be far more satisfactory than a prosecution. I think that it should be statutory that if an act of cruelty is taking place, there is no need for the measure that we are considering, but if it is a duty-of-care issue, there should perhaps be a parking ticket-type warning. We all understand how parking tickets work. It is possible to appeal against one, but that is rare. That type of safeguard would mean that pet owners could be confident that if they went wrong—probably inadvertently—they would be brought right quickly, rather than prosecuted. That extra security is an important freedom that we all deserve.

Ben Bradshaw: That power already exists. I am simply trying to spell out some of the difficulties and some of the matters that we need to examine when considering whether we need statutory improvement notices.

Norman Baker: On one hand, there is the written advice, which does not have that statutory function but nevertheless gets across the concerns and enables the person with responsibility for the animal to improve its care. On the other hand, there is the improvement notice. Is it not a concern that such a notice would, as the Minister says, include a right of appeal, which could mean that the animal was kept in unsatisfactory conditions pending the appeal being heard?

Ben Bradshaw: I agree and I would not want to tie someone’s hands if the RSPCA or the SVS wanted to go straight in and make a prosecution. I would not want to insist that they go through an improvement notice system first.
If an improvement notice does not have teeth, it is the same as written advice. Public authorities, such as local authorities or the state veterinary service, that carry out inspection of farm animals will, as a matter of good practice, give such advice before considering prosecutions. I would expect and always encourage them to continue to do that through a code of practice,  if necessary. The area is complex and has already been considered at length, not least during the pre-legislative scrutiny process. I am happy to reflect on it further, but I am not yet convinced that we need to include such a provision.
In short, the act of abandoning an animal will still be an offence under the Bill. There is no explicit provision for it because we do not want to make the Bill longer or more complex than it has to be and we do not consider that such a provision would add anything. That does not in any way downgrade the offence. The same penalties are available under the Bill as are available under the Abandonment of Animals Act 1960 if the animal is caused unnecessary suffering. In fact, the Bill adds another layer of protection because of the welfare offence.
Clause 10 already provides for the powers in amendments Nos. 194, 199 and 201 should the appropriate authority consider them necessary. It is therefore not necessary to provide for such regulatory powers in the Bill. On that basis, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.

David Drew: I hear what the Minister is saying. I used the probing amendment as an opportunity for him to clarify the situation. I am more than satisfied, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Drew: I beg to move amendment No. 197, in clause 10, page 5, line 22, at end insert—
‘(aa)make provision for prohibiting the keeping of primates (including provision making exception from a prohibition);’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to take the following:
New clause 1—Prohibition on keeping certain animals—
‘(1)The appropriate national authority may by regulations prohibit the keeping at—
(a)domestic premises, or
(b)other premises,
of primates.
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1) “other premises” means premises of such other type as are prescribed.
(3)Any regulation made under subsection (1) must be for the purposes of securing the welfare of primates.
(4)Regulations made under subsection (1) may include, in particular—
(a)provision for the enforcement, other than by way of proceedings for an offence, of the regulations;
(b)provision—
(i)that breach of any part of the regulations is an offence, and
(ii)for penalties as respects the offence;
(c)provision for and in connection with post-conviction orders in relation to an offence under the regulations;
(d)provision conferring on persons of a specified description powers of entry, search, inspection and seizure in connection with breaches (and suspected breaches) of provisions of the regulations;
(e)provision—
(i)that obstructing a person in the exercise of a power conferred by the regulations is an offence, and
(ii)for penalties as respects the offence;
(f)provision (whether or not subject to specified conditions) for exemptions from, or qualification to, an offence under the regulations.
(5)Before making regulations under subsection (1), the appropriate national authority must consult—
(a)such persons appearing to them to represent relevant interests, and
(b)such other persons as they consider appropriate.’.

David Drew: Perhaps I will not be quite so amenable about this amendment; I may not be quite as brief as I was in speaking to the previous group. Amendment No. 197 and new clause 1 are crucial. The Government have made their intentions clear: they see the Bill as enabling legislation. To repeat the Minister’s well-used analogy, it is not a Christmas tree. I sympathise with that view, but I do not totally go along with it, and this is one of the areas where I do not go along with it.
Some of us were able to meet the Born Free Foundation and the RSPCA yesterday. For many years, the one thing they have clearly asked of us is a prohibition on the keeping of primates as pets. As far as the Bill is concerned, I go along with the Government in every regard bar tail docking and this issue. The Government have to stand up and be counted on this. In this day and age, there is no reason why someone should keep a primate as a pet. I hope that the Government will spell out their intentions as clearly as possible.
I shall listen to what the Minister says, but I hope that he will introduce such a provision on Report. I hope that it is the overwhelming view of the Committee that the keeping of primates as pets in the 21st century is totally unacceptable. We are talking about a small number of animals, between 1,500 and 3,000. Why is prohibition needed? It is not just a question of cruelty, suitability and appropriateness, but of animal diseases. We all know that the rarer a species, the more likely it is to be a carrier of complex diseases. In a sense we are trying to bring the provision into the Government’s disease control strategy.
There are many reasons why clause 10 needs to be amended. I would prefer the Government to state in the Bill—otherwise they should introduce secondary legislation as a matter of urgency—that the keeping of primates as pets is banned. That would receive overwhelming support from all but the very small number of owners who choose to keep such animals as pets for whatever reason. I accept that we must be clear about what we mean by a pet and about location, or there may be difficulties with zoos and sanctuaries, although not so much with circuses nowadays—we are eternally grateful that they seem to have moved on. The Minister would have to consider carefully how the provision would be worded in secondary legislation, but I am looking to him to do the decent thing and to make it clear in clause 10, having clearly spelt out the Government’s intention and having taken the temperature of the Committee, that it is no longer proper to keep a primate as a pet.

3.2 pm

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Norman Baker: At some point in his reply, will the Minister say exactly what his policy is on free votes for Labour Members? I have raised the matter twice so far, but have not yet had a reply. We have had three or four votes when Labour Members have expressed concerns, yet the voting has been along party lines. I am not complaining if that is how matters are, but it would he helpful to know exactly what freedom his colleagues have. Keeping primates as pets is a free-vote issue for Liberal Democrat Members. It would be useful to know whether it is for Labour Members.
That Government have admitted that primates are not suitable for the general pet trade. That emerged from the consultation paper on the use of powers under article 8.2 of EU regulation 338/97, which prohibits the keeping of CITES specimens. But paragraph 26 of the regulatory impact assessment that accompanies the Bill states that the Government do not have any intention of using the Bill to ban the keeping of primates on welfare grounds. There seems to be a contradiction, which raises the question whether any subsequent code of conduct that might be introduced would have that effect.
The equivalent Bill that is being scrutinised by the Scottish Parliament—the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill—has a specific clause allowing a Scottish Minister to make regulations to prohibit the keeping of certain animals. I understand from my Scottish colleagues that clause 25 of that Bill was deliberately inserted to deal with primates. Of course we do not always have the same rules and regulations north and south of the border—that is the purpose of devolution—but there is a strong case for dealing with keeping primates as pets, which is reinforced by the position that the Scottish legislature is taking.
 The hon. Member for Leominster asked how many such primates there are. Experts believe that as many as 3,000 marmosets, lemurs and other monkeys are being kept as pets in the United Kingdom. The only legislation on licensing ownership of primates as pets is the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976, but even that Act does not require licensing for the most commonly kept primates—marmosets—and the Act is rarely adhered to. The Minister should be aware that a study commissioned by DEFRA in 2000 estimated that there was 85 per cent. non-compliance with 1976 Act. He should also be aware that that Act was introduced primarily to deal with health and safety issues—predominantly the safety of the public—rather than with the welfare of the animals concerned. It would be inappropriate to rely on that Act to guarantee any welfare conditions for primates kept as pets.
The Minister will freely recognise that primates have a particular place in the animal kingdom. They have a high level of intelligence and therefore a greater capacity for unexpected or difficult behaviour, as well as a greater capacity to suffer when relegated to a poor or inappropriate lifestyle. The Minister and the Government have recognised the special position, for example, of great apes, which are now excluded from  being used in scientific experiments as a result of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The Government voluntarily took steps to recognise the special position of those animals, so it is legitimate to raise the question of primates here. If the Government recognise the special position of certain primates in that situation, we should ask them to do the same thing here again.
Primates are difficult to deal with as pets. It is different from having a cat as a pet, even—dare I say it—if the cat is the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Galloway), whom we have recently seen on television. Having a primate as a pet imposes particular requirements on the owner or person responsible. The animal’s needs are complex and frequently more difficult to discharge, and if they are not discharged the animal can suffer more as a consequence, particularly given the high capacity for suffering and understanding that primates have.
We are dealing with an amendment and a new clause that have the same effect. Amendment No. 197 was tabled by the hon. Member for Stroud, and new clause 1 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-West. I ask the Minister to respond to the serious issues that have been raised. It is not clear that the Government intend to do anything, given the statement in paragraph 26 of the regulatory impact assessment. I hope that I am wrong about that, but if he relies on a code of conduct, that poses difficulties. The cat code consisted of 17 pages about cats, which are obviously less complex to deal with than primates. Any code about primates would be a long code of conduct, which would be difficult to adhere to; but if it were the same length as the one for cats, it would not acknowledge the complex nature of the animals’ needs in question.
The simplest approach is to say that in the 21st century it is odd to keep primates as pets. We have moved away from that sort of arrangement. Quite rightly, because of public disquiet, we do not have the same range of animals in circuses that we used to have; no doubt that subject will come up later in consideration of the Bill. There is generally higher respect for animals, greater understanding among the public at large about animals’ needs, and greater unhappiness about people keeping primates as pets than there used to be, so I hope that the Minister will respond sympathetically to both the amendment and the new clause.

Nia Griffith: I support my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud in suggesting a specific prohibition on the keeping of primates as pets. We can easily understand that nobody in Britain can possibly provide an environment suitable for a polar bear in a private house, but there is still, unfortunately—although we no longer have the chimpanzees’ tea parties—a lot of misconceptions about the nature of primates. They are still seen as being very like humans, whereas in fact they have immensely complex social and physical needs which nobody can provide for. Unfortunately, there is still a lot of ignorance about  their needs and a temptation for people to see them as something rather exotic and playful that will amuse the children, without having any conception of the difficulties that that might cause later on. For that reason, the Bill must explicitly prohibit the keeping of primates as pets.

Ben Bradshaw: We all agree that primates do not make suitable pets. They are not allowed in the general pet trade and imports are already limited to zoos, scientific institutions and specialist private keepers. I am sure that hon. Members will be familiar with the work of the International Fund for Animal Welfare on this issue. Some Members may have been lobbied by the fund. On Second Reading, I made it clear that we have sympathy with the aims of the amendments and the new clauses.
The Government have acknowledged the problem. DEFRA’s global wildlife division is considering the feasibility of measures under article 3.2 of CITES to tackle the problem on the basis of conservation. I encourage hon. Members to remember that the Bill is primarily aimed not at banning any particular animal-keeping activities, but at ensuring that the welfare needs of animals are met and, through the introduction of the welfare offence, that someone is responsible for them. Legislation will be backed up by codes of practice and regulations that are appropriate to the types of animals concerned.
I can tell the hon. Member for Lewes and my hon. Friends the Members for Stroud and for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) that, as a priority, the Government intend to develop a code for the keeping of primates. Its likely effect will be to restrict their keeping to zoos, scientific institutions and specialist keepers.

Paddy Tipping: Is the Minister saying his officials have advised him that when the welfare tests are available, the keeping of primates as pets will in effect be banned, that this is enabling legislation and that after it is introduced with regulations, no primates will be kept as pets?

Ben Bradshaw: Yes, exactly so. I was going to assure the hon. Member for Lewes that the Bill allows us to introduce such secondary legislation.

Bill Wiggin: Who does the Minister count as a specialist keeper?

Ben Bradshaw: We would have to consult on that and make the decision in relation to secondary legislation. There is an example in the constituency of the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Jim Knight), of somebody who has great experience of offering a good environment for the keeping of primates, some of which have been rescued from people who have been unable to keep them as pets. It is a sort of monkey sanctuary. I should not want to pre-empt the possibility of such facilities remaining open. We shall discuss that sort of thing when the secondary legislation is made.

Norman Baker: I have been to that monkey sanctuary and I would not want to restrict the splendid work that it does. However, the Minister is relying on a code of practice. Clause 12(3) deals with codes of practice, stating:
“A person’s failure to comply with a provision of a code of practice issued under this section shall not of itself render him liable to proceedings of any kind.”
If we are to rely on codes of practice, we must be sure that they are effective in securing the improvements that we want.

Ben Bradshaw: The same point could be made about anything under the welfare offence. I entirely agree.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point about devolution, I wanted to reassure him that clause 10(2)(a) will allow the restriction or a ban on the keeping of a certain species of animal, including primates, under secondary legislation if such action is considered necessary to protect their welfare. We are mindful of concerns about that, but following discussions with our draftsmen, we think that the scope of existing delegated powers has already been confirmed. On that basis, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Norman Baker: I am grateful to the Minister for his response. He is sympathetic and recognises the reasons why it is inappropriate for primates to be kept as pets, as they have been in depressingly large numbers in this country. He knows that the public at large support that view. A MORI poll conducted in October 2005 showed that 79 per cent. of the public thought that the keeping of primates as pets should be made illegal, so there is clearly a head of steam among the public for a ban.
The Minister is trying to avoid bans. At least I know the reasons for that approach. Without rehearsing the arguments of the last debate, I point out that he wants to rely instead on a code of practice. He seems to be saying that the code of practice will be written in such a way as to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for an ordinary member of the public to keep a primate as a pet. That is a convoluted and long-winded way of achieving a ban. If the code achieves one, fair enough, but it would be simpler to be straightforward about it.
If the code of practice were to result in a ban, that would be welcome. The Minister said that he will introduce a code at an early stage—that is on the record—and that also is welcome. I reiterate my earlier point about the length of such documents. He will cause a great deal of work to be thrust upon his officials, who have to produce the code, despite a simpler solution being available through the amendment or new clause. However, that is his choice.
It is important to flag up clause 12. If we are to rely on codes of practice, we must be sure that they are enforceable and that there are no get-out clauses. The fact that, in itself, there is not a prima facie case for a prosecution is a little worrying, but doubtless we shall come to that in clause 12. I do not intend to take the  matter too far in this discussion, but Members should be aware of the provision in that clause when they are considering this one.
I ask the Minister to give more details about clause 12, particularly clause 12(3), when we get to it. Under the circumstances, I reserve the right to move new clause 1 later in the proceedings, if I may do that, Mr. Gale. I believe that it is in order to do that.

Roger Gale: Strictly speaking, the hon. Gentleman ought to indicate now when he wants to move new clause 1. It could be moved formally later at the appropriate place in the proceedings, but he ought to indicate now if he wishes to do that. I shall let him ponder that, but perhaps he could let me know by the end of the afternoon.

Norman Baker: I am grateful, Mr. Gale, for such unusual flexibility from the Chair, which is helpful. I am not trying to threaten the Minister with new clause 1, but nor do I want to close down my options later. I shall therefore reflect on the matter, as you suggest. Doubtless the hon. Member for Stroud will have a view on his amendment.

David Drew: I am looking for absolute clarity from my hon. Friend the Minister on how the process will operate. Let me take him through how I see events occurring, but he may wish to intervene on me. There has been a clear indication from the Committee of its views, so it does not seem to need to vote. On Second Reading, perhaps there was not such a clear indication.

Bill Wiggin: I drew the Minister’s attention to what is meant by a proper keeper, or a person who would be fit to keep primates. For example, a zoo keeper who brings up young gorillas, chimps or any other primate that has been rejected by their mother may look after them at home. If the zoo were to go bust, the keeper would probably be first in line to try to take care of the monkey or primate afterwards, so I do not favour a total ban. The Minister probably has the degree of flexibility right. If the code of practice is sufficiently robust, I, like him, suspect that few primates, if any, would be kept.

David Drew: That intervention is very helpful. I would never want to fetter the Minister such that, in extremis, we caused additional cruelty rather than prevented it. We do not know what situations could arise.
Let me take the Minister through what I envisage will happen. As a result of my choosing not to press the amendment, I presume that the Government will subsequently make clear, if not before Third Reading, the nature of the secondary legislation that they intend to introduce in several areas. That secondary legislation will set out, with clarity, what the code of practice will be and that code will be enacted as a matter of urgency. We have already discussed the secondary legislation for tail docking, which may follow later this year and that is good to hear. I know the Minister does not control the business programme, but the Department for Environment, Food and Rural  Affairs may think that that issue is so urgent and important that it will push hard for the Government to take a slot for a measure to deal with it.
This issue is equally important, but perhaps not so pressing. I hope that the Government will see fit to find the necessary legislative slot for the code of practice in due course. If that is the case, I will withdraw the amendment with alacrity, because we would be making progress. I see this enabling Bill as being fit for purpose if it does the things that we want.
Norman Bakerrose—
Mr. Bradshawrose—

David Drew: I shall give way to my hon. Friend the Minister first.

Ben Bradshaw: I urge my hon. Friend to leave some us flexibility to achieve what he and other members of the Committee want through a code of practice, which would be quicker than secondary legislation. As I emphasised earlier, that would be perfectly possible. In the end, it may be quicker to have a legally enforceable code of practice under the welfare offence. I beg him not to tie my hands too much because insisting on secondary legislation might take longer than a code of practice.

David Drew: That is very useful. The hon. Member for Lewes may want to come in, but I will first respond to what the Minister said. I want to be clear about the matter, which I hope will provide greater clarity for the Committee. I do not mind whether we take the secondary legislative route per se or the code of practice route with statutory underpinning; I just want the issue to be progressed as a matter of urgency.
Both secondary legislation and a code of practice would have to be undertaken following consultation, which brings me back to what the hon. Member for Leominster said. If there are exemptions that need to be spelt out in the code of practice or secondary legislation, that is the time to do it. I do not want to limit consultation, as we want to ensure that we get things absolutely right.
We have made progress. I am now clear about the matter although I hoped that the Minister would say whether the Government preferred the code of practice or secondary legislation. I believe that it is the former, and the hon. Member for Lewes will now help me in that respect.

Norman Baker: Having heard the exchanges, I am happy to give notice that I will not pursue new clause 1. I hope that helps you, Mr. Gale.
Does the hon. Member for Stroud accept that if the Government decide on the code of practice, it is important to deal with animals that are already kept as pets in order to ensure that they are properly cared for in the new regime? I would not want anyone to feel that an animal for which they have responsibility does not meet the terms of the code of practice and thus it will suffer as a result, perhaps by being destroyed. We must  have the flexibility to ensure that guidance is given to people who already have pets, as well as to those who may wish to acquire them.

David Drew: That is very helpful. I would not want to tie the Government’s hands. If they have good intentions, we must support them; it is about making the proposals as effective as possible. The code of practice should be introduced as a matter of urgency, as much as anything so that we can see what is in it and know whether further amendment is needed before it goes to consultation. If that process is as clear and transparent as possible, the measure will be as effective as it should be. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 10, page 5, line 23, leave out paragraph (b).

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 195, in clause 10, page 5, line 26, leave out ‘establishment’ and insert ‘appointment’.
No. 77, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
‘(2A)Regulations made under subsection (2) may not be designed to empower non-governmental organisations to the extent whereby such organisations’ powers extend into both animal welfare promotion and initiating animal welfare prosecutions.’.

Bill Wiggin: Amendment No. 74 has been tabled because worries have been expressed to me about who will be affected by the power in the clause. The Bill does not suggest who may or who may not be affected by the provision nor does it suggest how co-ordination will take place. I am worried especially that the provision can hand over a vast range of unchecked powers to the Secretary of State. Indeed, paragraph 44 of the Bill’s explanatory notes states that subsection (2)
“provides a non-exhaustive list of purposes for which the regulation-making power in subsection (1) may be exercised.”
I am not sure that I can endorse that approach.
For example, it is not clear whether it would mean that the appropriate national authority could use taxpayers’ money to subsidise the activities of charities or other organisations. It is not clear if it would mean that future regulations could be passed that would abrogate powers that are exercised exclusively by the police to non-governmental groups. It is with that in mind that I tabled the amendment. It would prevent regulations from getting out of control.
Amendment No. 77 would ensure that established organisations and bodies not under the direct control of a local authority or the Government could not hold dual powers to promote animal welfare and bring forward prosecutions.

Norman Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Bill Wiggin: No, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall not give way. The amendment is sensitive and complicated. It is not an attack on the RSPCA, and that will become clear. I shall be delighted to give way after I have finished what I have to say.
In its present form, the Bill is both vague about the nature of the powers that can be granted under the regulations. The amendment would set boundaries on the powers that can be granted. It would also prevent the Government from regulating to give organisations such as the RSPCA powers that involve a conflict of interests between welfare promotion activities and welfare prosecution activities. That would clearly create a conflict of interests, whereby bodies such as the RSPCA may well pursue prosecutions against certain individuals that are based on their own ideas and interpretation of the law.
Indeed, in order to prevent such conflicts of interest from happening, 20 years ago the then Conservative Government recognised that such matters may impact on the state’s ability to dispense justice, as a result of which they separated the majority of the police powers of prosecution and established the Crown Prosecution Service. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds recognised that conflict of interest and no longer pursues prosecutions, preferring to refer them to the Crown Prosecution Service. Moreover, the RSPCA’s counterpart in Scotland, the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, leaves prosecutions to the direction of the procurator fiscal. Clearly, it would be unacceptable for an unaccountable charity with its own agenda to be empowered by the Government through regulations.
As it stands, the RSPCA pursues both welfare activities and prosecutions, but it is not empowered by the Government to do so. It is allowed to do that, as it so wishes. That is the fine line.

Norman Baker: It seems that the hon. Gentleman is trying to change the present arrangements whereby the RSPCA promotes animal welfare and initiates prosecutions. I am not aware of particular problems with that. Can he give an example of a problem?

Bill Wiggin: The hon. Gentleman has not read the amendment clearly. It states:
“Regulations made under subsection (2) may not be designed to empower non-governmental organisations”.
That is the fine line. Yes, the RSPCA undertakes such action at the moment. I should be happy to send him a file full of examples, but that is not what the matter is about. I am talking about controlling. An inherent part of the Bill would be clarified by the two amendments that suggest that the Government should not empower NGOs and what is done with taxpayers’ money. I hope that I have answered his question.

David Drew: Why is “establishment” is used instead of “appointment”? The bodies will, in effect, be appointed. I want to understand what the difference is in law and am sure that the Minister will be able to explain. Does the wording make any difference to the responsibilities of those who oversee the welfare of animals? Those will be important roles and subject to challenge, as will the individuals concerned. We need to get things right.

Norman Baker: I rise to speak about amendment No. 77. Of course, I assume that the hon. Member for Leominster has good intentions, and his amendments so far have demonstrated that he has a strong commitment to animal welfare, as I hope do all people in the room. However, the way in which I read amendment No. 77, notwithstanding the explanation given, is that it would severely curtail the powers of bodies such as the RSPCA in a way that would be detrimental to the delivery of good animal welfare. Historically, the Government, intentionally or implicitly, have relied on the RSPCA to undertake prosecutions. The vast majority of the prosecutions work done on animal offences has been carried out by the RSPCA. We would be much worse off if it was limited in what it could do.

Bill Wiggin: I am reminded that the hon. Gentleman intervened on me on Second Reading on this very point. Empowerment is the key. Yes, the Government do rely on the RSPCA to undertake the bulk of prosecutions. The amendment is designed to prevent the Government from empowering NGOs of any sort. The RSPCA is obviously the one doing the job, which is why we are discussing it.

Norman Baker: Perhaps I will let the Minister deal with that point, but my initial reaction is that an organisation must be empowered to take action, otherwise it cannot take that action. It is not given a duty to take action, which is perhaps the point that the hon. Gentleman wants to make; it is given the power to do so. That power already exists, or else the action that has been taken could not have been taken. I am at something of a loss to know why this matter has been raised. I asked the hon. Gentleman to give me examples of where there has been a problem. If there is a problem, let us hear about it. No examples have been given so far. As far as I am concerned, the RSPCA has done a very good job of promoting animal welfare and undertaking prosecutions. I do not really see what the problem is.

Ben Bradshaw: One of the most important features of the Bill is the flexibility to respond to future circumstances. That will allow us to keep our animal welfare laws and enforcement practices up to date much more easily than previous legislation did. The published draft contained an extensive list of situations in which it would have been possible to exercise the power. In the interests of simplicity, we removed many of those from the final Bill as they are clearly included in the power in subsection (1) without the need to specify them individually. However, there are some important powers that it was felt might not otherwise be covered by subsection (1) and which should, therefore, still be listed as examples of how the overall power could be used. One of those is the power that the hon. Member for Leominster seeks to delete by means of amendment No. 74.
Throughout the long gestation of the Bill, I have heard many times the concern that there is too much inconsistency in the way in which animal welfare is enforced across the country. This provision is included to give the appropriate national authority the ability to  take action to respond to those concerns if necessary. It could prove to be important for the essential enforcement of the Bill. Things are improving in this regard, and statutory and voluntary agencies concerned with animal welfare, including local authorities, are making good strides in moving towards a more focused and co-ordinated approach to their work. The database that we propose to introduce to aid enforcement will also help to improve consistency. In spite of that, there is still a case for making sure that it is clear that subsection (1) gives the appropriate national authority the power to make provision to facilitate or improve the co-ordination of functions relating to animal welfare.
As for amendment No. 77, I tend to agree with the hon. Member for Lewes. Although the hon. Member for Leominster said that the amendment was nothing to do with the RSPCA, it certainly has not been interpreted in that way by the RSPCA, as it has told me. I agree with the hon. Member for Lewes that the RSPCA does excellent work in enforcing animal welfare legislation, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to it for that. It has played a crucial role in the enforcement of animal welfare since the middle of the 19th century, and it would be a huge blow for animal welfare if it were to cease to do that work.
The RSPCA’s enforcement role stems from the fact that animal welfare legislation is—as is much other law in this country—common informers legislation, meaning that anyone can consider bringing a prosecution if they wish. The RSPCA currently investigates cases and brings prosecutions in a private capacity, and it will be in a private capacity that it will continue to do so. I have already emphasised on Second Reading that the RSPCA does not seek additional powers, and I hope that that is now finally understood.
The first of the hon. Gentleman’s amendments on this subject, and indeed his winding-up speech on Second Reading, indicated that he is concerned about the potential conflict of interest around the RSPCA investigating and prosecuting animal welfare cases. His intention in proposing amendment No. 77 appears to be to prevent the Government from appointing the RSPCA, or any other non-governmental organisation, as enforcers under secondary legislation if they are also going to prosecute offences.
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s desire that enforcers be open, accountable and free from any conflict of interest, and we will certainly ensure when the regulations are put in place that every step is taken to ensure openness and accountability of our nominated enforcers. However, I have to disagree that this is the way to achieve it. Let us carry the implications of his amendment through using an example.

Bill Wiggin: Does what the Minister just said mean that it is his intention to empower RSPCA inspectors as enforcers?

Ben Bradshaw: They are already empowered under current legislation. The hon. Gentleman does not seem quite to have grasped that.

Bill Wiggin: My reading of the Bill is that it empowers local government inspectors, not the RSPCA, which acts as a charity and has asked for no more powers, wants no more powers and is prepared to initiate prosecutions privately. I read what the Minister has said as different from that, which is why I query it.

Ben Bradshaw: The hon. Gentleman seems to be confusing the issue of the role and definition of inspectors, which covers local government and SVS employers, and the power of the RSPCA to investigate and prosecute cases, which exists at present and will continue to exist under the Bill.

Bill Wiggin: There is no power.

Ben Bradshaw: I think the hon. Gentleman has misunderstood the nature of what is being proposed. I was about to give another example to the Committee. Let us put the RSPCA to one side for a moment so that he can perhaps better understand the implication of amendment No. 77. If we were satisfied in future as to the capability of the National Greyhound Racing Club to see that regulations relating to the welfare of racing greyhounds were enforced, it would seem imperative that it should have the ability to bring prosecutions against those of its members who failed to comply with the requirements of the law. Likewise, turning to my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes, if we were satisfied that the Performing Animals Welfare Standards International could regulate the performing animals industry itself, it would surely be imperative that it had the ability to prosecute its members for welfare violations.
The effect of the hon. Gentleman’s first amendment would be to bar completely any form of effective self-regulation, by preventing regulators from bringing prosecutions. It would also be contrary to better regulation to have to duplicate effective self regulation by local or central Government action. Often bodies such as industry associations, many of whom issue excellent codes of practice for their members, are best placed to identify problems and take corrective action. Normal duties of a prosecutor would apply.
Were the amendment accepted, there would be total confusion when it came to enforcement of the law. The RSPCA would under Clause 8 be able to investigate and prosecute the welfare offence but would be barred from enforcing secondary legislation passed to support the requirements of clause 8. Its ability to enforce the law would be undermined. Animal welfare is, and always has been, common informers legislation, and to change that position would put an unreasonable burden on our police and Crown Prosecution Service, and it would not be in the interests of animal welfare. In reality, the extent to which those who breach animal welfare requirements could be brought to justice would be seriously diminished if the amendments were approved.
I agree that it is right to look critically at the work of any enforcement body. We have done so with regard to the RSPCA, and we have considered carefully whether it is appropriate to continue the long-established common informers regime in the new legislation. We have concluded that it is clearly in the interests of animal welfare to do so. I consider that the RSPCA’s record is impressive, as are those of many other animal welfare organisations. To take away its ability to investigate and prosecute would be an unnecessary and retrograde step.
Amendment No. 195 would provide that the appropriate national authority could establish bodies to have functions with regard to providing advice on animal welfare, should there be a need in future. The difference between “established” and “appointed” is that one appoints a person and one establishes a body. I hope that helps clear the matter up for my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud.
On the basis of my remarks, I urge the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I am glad that we have had this discussion because the amendments were intended seek clarification as to how the Government would spend taxpayers’ money and who this clause would empower. The Minister did not choose to tell me about that. Instead, he focused on the worst possible interpretation of the amendment. Nothing in it would prevent the RSPCA from doing anything that it is doing today or from doing more under the Bill.
I am prepared to take the Minister’s advice that I may have got it wrong, but I was not satisfied with the other part of his answer. The current situation is quite clear, but it is also clear that in a perfect world the police would prosecute through the Crown Prosecution Service. It is not a perfect world and there is a shortage of facilities and resources. To some extent, the Government have allowed the policing of animal welfare to be carried out by the charity sector. For practical purposes, the Minister is right to pay tribute to the RSPCA; it does a very good job, although there will always be those who do not agree. A group gave evidence to the Select Committee that felt very passionately about the matter, and I suspect that in every case involving a large organisation, someone will get over-enthusiastic and create a bad impression. I know that the RSPCA goes to a great deal of trouble to investigate and put such situations right where possible.
This group of amendments would have included in the Bill a proper and clear guide to what empowerment means. If someone has the ability to do something, that is not empowerment. The amendments would have given extra powers or funds to an organisation; that is why I felt they were valid. I fully accept some of the Minister’s arguments. The debate has clarified some of my points, so I think that we should make progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Greg Mulholland: I beg to move amendment No. 202, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
‘(2A)Regulations made under subsection (1), in reference to subsection (2)(a), shall include the requirement for the provision of approved information leaflets about the animal and its needs to those buying pet animals from commercial vendors.’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 203, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
‘(2A)Regulations made under subsection (1), in reference to subsection (2)(a), shall include the requirement for pet vendors to issue a document declaring pet ownership, to be signed by vendor and buyer to be issued upon the purchase of an animal and with a copy to be retained by the seller for a period of 6 months.’.

Greg Mulholland: I am glad that the Committee managed to hang on until I returned. I had to pop out to do a television programme. As a journalist outside the Committee Room noticed, I am wearing make-up, but hon. Members can be assured that that is why.

David Drew: Very nice, too.

Greg Mulholland: Thank you. Apparently, it makes me look a little darker.

Shona McIsaac: Is it cruelty free?

Greg Mulholland: The hon. Lady will be reassured to know that it was not tested on animals.
I hope that the Minister understands why I have tabled the amendment. We are all aware that the Bill is an enabling one, and we understand the reasons for that. Nevertheless, the Minister is aware that we are concerned that we may miss opportunities in some areas. In this case, I wanted to raise the opportunity to introduce positive, educative measures to encourage good practices regarding animal welfare.
The most significant and welcome element of the Bill is the new duty of care introduced by clause 8, which makes people legally responsible for the care and welfare of their animals. If that responsibility is not communicated at the point of purchase or before, it is unlikely to be accepted or understood.
All of us here have a passionate interest in this subject and we all agree that for much of the Bill to work and to address the issue that I am raising—neglect of domestic pets—there needs to be greater responsibility among pet owners and vendors. I know local pet vendors who do not take their responsibility seriously enough.
Current legislation makes it a legal requirement to provide instructions for all electrical goods, foodstuffs, cleaning products and even bathroom items such as soap when they are sold, but not for a domestic pet. People receive a certificate of ownership when they buy cars, land, guns, some antiques and even some Star Trek original memorabilia—I do not have any—but not when they buy a cat or even a dog.
In other policy areas, the Government are often prepared to use legislation to try to encourage positive, responsible behaviour, and sometimes that is welcome; for example, the citizenship agenda in schools. Legislation can sometimes be simple to  implement, easy to monitor and inexpensive in terms of public expenditure, as in this case. That is why I tabled the amendments, and I hope that the Minister will bear that in mind when he considers secondary legislation. I hope that through that process we can engender more responsibility among our citizens for the care of domestic pets.

Angela Smith: I do not intend to speak for long because I know that the Committee wants to finish. However, it is necessary to say something in support of the spirit behind the amendment, although I feel that the subsection to which it applies probably covers the eventuality already. It is worth making the point that many pet owners and potential owners need information about the standard of welfare that the Bill will put in place and they need to understand that at the point of purchase.
The draft cat code that was issued to us on Tuesday is excellent—it is very detailed—but it is not readily accessible by every pet owner or potential pet owner. Leaflets and guides that outline the duty of care must be concise, illustrated and pitched at a level that everyone can understand. For a number of years, I taught English and literacy to adults with literacy needs; the code would not be read or understood by a significant proportion of the population. I do not intend in any way to insult the population, but I want to point out that it is essential to have the information presented as concisely and clearly as possible. That is critical to ensure that the duty of care means something rather than just being on the statute book. Having the law in place is one thing; making it work is another. The spirit of the amendment suggests how we can make it work.

Ben Bradshaw: I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Leeds, North-East that that is indeed our intention. We propose to do that in secondary legislation rather than in the Bill for the reasons that we have discussed at length. We intend to require pet vendors to provide care leaflets for the species that they sell and we will encourage private keepers to do the same. The secondary legislation will set out the necessary detail of how that will operate. I hope that, on the basis of that explanation, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Greg Mulholland: I thank the Minister for his comments and hope that he appreciates why I raised the matter. I made it clear that I expect the provision to take that path. I have made my point and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 78, in clause 10, page 5, line 45, at end insert—
‘(6)The appropriate national authority shall make regulations only when it is apparent that—
(a)any existing voluntary regulations are not effectively safeguarding animal welfare consistently, or
(b)attempts to establish a voluntary set of regulations to safeguard animal welfare have failed.’.
The amendment is designed to promote self-regulation and limit Government intervention. The Bill places no onus on organisations to self-regulate. I believe the Minister drew the Committee’s attention to that idea just a few moments ago.
Governments should let individuals make rules for themselves, and politicians should intervene only when the rules are insufficient. There are also clear benefits to promoting and facilitating self-regulation, as it will reduce the burdens on Government and parliamentary time. Moreover, it will enable those with sufficient expertise and experience to establish regulations, free from the political influences that contact with politicians can all too often have. The amendment does not prevent the Government from regulating. It does, however, improve non-governmental participation.

Ben Bradshaw: The amendment, as the hon. Gentleman said, seeks to limit the use of delegated powers in clause 10 to situations in which self-regulation has failed. In deciding whether to make regulations, the Government will, of course, need to follow the general principles concerning the proper use of such powers, including the need to ensure that the degree of regulation is proportionate. As hon. Members know, self-regulation is one of the cornerstones of this Government’s better regulation policy and is preferred to regulation by the state.
Mr. Holloboneindicated dissent.

Ben Bradshaw: I hope that the hon. Gentleman who is laughing will support us when we resist, as I am sure we will have to in future, calls for regulation before the options of self-regulation on certain issues dealt with by the Bill have been exhausted.
We would bring in regulations only if self-regulation were not working. Furthermore, consultation, pre-legislative scrutiny where appropriate, and parliamentary debate as part of the affirmative procedure set out in clause 55 will ensure that any proposals are debated fully, openly and transparently. That should also help ensure that unnecessary regulations, such as those that amendment No. 78 seeks to prevent, would not be introduced.

Norman Baker: Can the Minister confirm that this is not a free-vote issue for his party and indicate when free votes are applicable to his colleagues?

Ben Bradshaw: I do not intend to bite the hon. Gentleman’s bait on free votes. The Government have made their position clear, particularly on tail docking, to which he referred. We had a long debate on that matter on Tuesday afternoon. We listened; we said that we would listen to the views of Parliament. I think I said on Tuesday that, should the issue be raised in the Chamber, we would not consider it an appropriate one for Government whipping. However, if the hon. Gentleman is asking me to say that we would not strongly encourage Government Members to resist him hanging lots of baubles on the Bill and other issues, I am afraid that I cannot satisfy him in the affirmative.

David Drew: Some of us do not need the provocation of free votes, or otherwise, to make a point.
To be helpful to the Minister, the Committee has worked quite consensually. We have had a limited number of votes. I do not see the point of having votes for the sake of it. The Minister can take it from me that he is doing a good job and we will vote accordingly when we need to.

Ben Bradshaw: That is very kind of my hon. Friend.
On the basis of what I was saying earlier about the need for better regulation, I hope that the hon. Member for Leominster will withdraw his amendment.

Bill Wiggin: As I understand it, the Government are intending to do what I have asked them to do on this matter of regulation anyway, which I hope will make the amendment superfluous.
I hope that we have handled satisfactorily the delicate issue of regulation, which needs to be considered carefully. People have enormous emotional attachments to their pets and they fear the way that they are to be policed. I hope that we have covered sufficiently the causes of their fears. This is the end of the sitting and I do not want to delay the Committee any more, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Tony Cunningham.]

Adjourned accordingly at eleven minutes past Four o’clock till Tuesday 24 January at half-past Ten o’clock.